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Abstract
This thesis examines the mechanisms by which retail markets converge to a concentrated struc-
ture where competition is dominated by only a few large firms. Using a model of competition
based on the vertical product differentiation (VPD) enciogenous sunk cost framework proposed
by Sutton (1991), several empirical implications are identified and evaluated using a detailed
dataset of store level observations from the supermarket industry. Chapter 2 provides a for-
mal test of the hypothesis that the high levels of concentration observed in the supermarket
industry are the result of competitive investment in endogenous sunk costs. Using the bounds
regression methodology developed in Sutton (1991), I document the existence of a large, posi-
tive lower bound to concentration that remains bounded above zero regardless of market size.
This exercise is supplemented by a detailed case history of the industry that provides additional
evidence that competition is focused on sunk outlays. In chapter 3, I expand the analysis by
focusing on the local structure of competition. The principal contributions of the empirical
work presented in this chapter involve identifying the high quality set of supermarket firms,
demonstrating that they exist only in bounded numbers (do not increase proportionately with
the size of the market), and identifying features of the observed market structure which are
inconsistent with alternative explanations, namely by highlighting the distinctive nature of
strategic complementarity. As such, I demonstrate that the VPD framework accords well with
the combination of features observed in the supermarket industry, providing an accurate rep-
resentation of the mechanisms sustaining its concentrated structure, which appear to be both
competitive and stable. Three formal models of retail competition are presented in chapter 4,
along with testable implications regarding the strategic interactions of rival firms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the past two decades, several retail industries have become dominated by strong regional
or even national chains. Whether the market is video rentals, auto supplies, books, or office
supplies, these stores share several common features: a wide selection, aggressive pricing and
advertising, quick turnover, and significant investment in advanced information and distribu-
tion systems (Bendetti and Zellner, 1992; Chakravarty, 1991; Chanil, 1991; Messinger and
Narasimhan, 1995; Power and Dunkin, 1990; Saporito, 1991; Zinn and Power, 1990). Firms
such as Home Depot, Staples and Crown Books have become household names by providing
a staggering array of products at very competitive prices (Bagwell et al., 1997). While there
are clearly strong forces encouraging the formation of larger and larger chains, what is unclear
is whether these industries are tending toward local monopolies. An alternative hypothesis is
that at least some of these retail industries are tending towards "natural" oligopolies, charac-
terized by a small number of firms - but greater than one firm - competing head-to-head in
quality in local markets. Because the nature of competition is so different across these two
market structures (segmented monopolies versus head-to-head oligopoly), discerning the na-
ture of competition in these markets is important both for antitrust policy as well our more
general understanding of retail industries. By focusing on the supermarket industry, where
rapidly growing regional chains offer an ever expanding selection of products (Messinger and
Narasimhan, 1995), this paper evaluates the differences between these two hypotheses and sug-
gests a methodology for how such an analysis might be applied to retail markets in general.
The principal contributions of the empirical work presented in this paper involve identifying
the high quality set of supermarket firms, demonstrating that they exist only in bounded num-
bers (do not increase proportionately with the size of the market), and identifying features of
the observed market structure which are inconsistent with alternative explanations, namely by
highlighting the distinctive nature of strategic complementarity.
This thesis examines the mechanisms by which retail markets converge to a concentrated
structure where competition is dominated by only a few large firms. Using a model of com-
petition based on the vertical product differentiation (VPD) endogenous sunk cost framework
proposed by Sutton (1991), several empirical implications are identified and evaluated using a
detailed dataset of store level observations from the supermarket industry. Chapter 2 provides
a formal test of the hypothesis that the high levels of concentration observed in the super-
market industry are the result of competitive investment in endogenous sunk costs. Using the
bounds regression methodology developed in Sutton (1991), I document the existence of a large,
positive lower bound to concentration that remains bounded above zero regardless of market
size. This exercise is supplemented by a detailed case history of the industry that provides
additional evidence that competition is focused on sunk outlays. In chapter 3, I expand the
analysis by focusing on the local structure of competition. The principal contributions of the
empirical work presented in this chapter involve identifying the high quality set of supermarket
firms, demonstrating that they exist only in bounded numbers (do not increase proportionately
with the size of the market), and identifying features of the observed market structure which
are inconsistent with alternative explanations, namely by highlighting the distinctive nature of
strategic complementarity. As such, I demonstrate that the VPD framework accords well with
the combination of features observed in the supermarket industry, providing an accurate rep-
resentation of the mechanisms sustaining its concentrated structure, which appear to be both
competitive and stable. Three formal models of retail competition are presented in chapter 4,
along with testable implications regarding the strategic interactions of rival firms.
The formal test of the VPD framework is presented in Chapter 2. First, using a detailed
case history of the retail food industry, I document the innovations that led to the exit of a
large number of unprofitable firms and increased concentration, highlighting the escalation in
both store size and (to a lesser extent) advertising that differentiated the supermarket industry
from the smaller (in both store size and total revenue) grocery industry. Next, using the
bounds-regression methodology on a large sample of distinct geographic markets, I document
the existence of a large, positive lower bound to the four-firm concentration ratio (C4) in the
supermarket industry that asymptotes with increasing market size to a level above 30%. Using
data from 1972 and 1998, I demonstrate that this bound has remained stable for at least 25 years.
Since supermarkets invest extensively in store size and product selection and grocery stores
compete mostly on the basis of location, the hypothesis that endogenous sunk cost investment
is much more effective in the supermarket industry can be tested using a comparison of the
two industries. Indeed, I find that C4 in the grocery industry decreases to a level below 10%.
While concentration in the grocery industry is not found to converge to zero, the asymptotic
levels predicted constitute a very small degree of concentration, suggesting the role (if any)
of endogenous sunk costs in the grocery industry is very limited. In contrast, the asymptotic
values found in the supermarket industry converge to a level above 30%, substantially higher
than the levels found in the grocery industry. These results indicate that endogenous sunk costs
are an important source of concentration in the supermarket industry and may be related to
competitive efforts to expand product selection through joint store-firm investments.
Chapter 3 expands this exercise by looking at behavior "above the bound." I exploit the
nature of supermarket competition, namely the existence of geographically distinct markets, to
provide explicit tests of the predictions of the VPD model, to identify features of the observed
market structure which are inconsistent with alternative models, and, in so doing, deepen our
understanding of the nature of retail competition. This empirical characterization is achieved
by exploiting a novel dataset of store level observations in 320 geographical markets, where a
market is a Metropolitan Statistical Area. Examining these markets, I establish the existence
of an oligopolistic structure that does not fragment as market size expands. By narrowing our
focus to the store level, I demonstrate that this natural oligopoly extends all the way down to
the most local levels. Unable to carve out distinct geographic markets, the natural "oligarchs"
compete head to head for the same consumers. I then use this very local nature of competition
to demonstrate that quality choice is a strategic complement among supermarkets in the same
local markets. Using store size (as a proxy for product brandwidth) to measure quality, I provide
evidence that the presence of rival high quality firms forces competing stores to increase their
own level of quality. I account for endogeneity using instruments constructed from the average
size of rival's stores outside of the local market.
Chapter 4 contains three formal models of competition in retail markets. The purpose of
this chapter is to formulate a model of retail competition with endogenous sunk investments
where a few low-cost or high-quality firms - but not one firm - emerge in equilibrium. In
addition, I demonstrate that, when investments in quality increase consumers willingness-to-
pay, the strategic interaction between firms can distinguish oligopoly models from mechanisms
leading to a single dominant firm. To understand this exercise more clearly, I first review the
baseline endogenous sunk cost vertical product differentiation (VPD) model developed in Sutton
(1991). I demonstrate that, in this model of quality differentiation, the level of quality chosen
by rival firms behaves as a strategic substitute. Next, applying the central insight of Spence
(1975, 1976) - that when services or quality are a perfect substitute for price reductions, so that
consumers care only about price per unit of quality (efficiency units), quality increases are the
equivalent of price reductions from the point of view of both buyer and seller - I demonstrate
that Sutton's quality differentiation model is equivalent to a model of cost reducing investment.
Reinterpreted as a model of cost reduction, Sutton's natural oligopoly result seems to apply not
only to models of quality differentiation, but to any industrial application where "rivalry is both
tough and focused on fixed outlays, not on per-unit price-cost margins" (Schmalensee, 1992).
The central theoretical contribution of this paper is demonstrating that when the relationship
between quality and price is non-linear (so that quality and price are no longer forced to
be proportional) the strategic interaction between firms shifts from strategic substitutes to
complements. The results on the strategic interaction between firms demonstrate that, by
estimating firm's reaction functions, it is possible to distinguish models where quality increases
expand consumer's willingness-to-pay from models of cost-reducing investment.
Chapter 2
Does Endogenous Sunk Cost
Competition Explain Concentration
in the Supermarket Industry?
2.1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the economic forces shaping the degree of concentra-
tion within industries, and how such concentration is influenced by the strategic interaction
among firms. While the pioneering work of Bain (1951, 1962, 1956) emphasized the strategic
determinants cf concentration, Demsetz (1974) and Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) focused
instead on efficiency differences between heterogenous firms. The debate deepened with the
emergence of a wealth of game theoretic models in the 1980s, emphasizing the strategic interac-
tion between firms but placing few restrictions on the set of possible outcomes (Gilbert (1989)
provides a detailed review). Building on research in the 1980s that highlighted the critical rela-
tionship between the nature of fixed costs and the conditions determining entry (Spence, 1982;
Bresnahan and Reiss, 1987; Berry, 1992), Sutton (1991) provides a synthesis and extension of
this work by focusing attention on a) whether fixed costs are exogenously determined or the
product of strategic interaction and b) the relationship between equilibrium concentration and
the size of the market. The principal contribution of this paper is to provide further empirical
insight into this relationship and the Sutton framework by applying the methodology proposed
by Sutton to geographically localized retail markets. Specifically, I present empirical evidence
that competition in the supermarket industry is focused on endogenously determined sunk costs
and, as a result of this competition, concentration remains bounded above zero regardless of
the size of the market.
To understand this exercise more clearly, this paper first reviews Sutton's principal insight
and underlying methodology. Although the game theoretic entry models developed in the
1980s admit a tangled complexity of outcomes that depend critically on the structure of the
particular game specification (Bresnahan, 1992), Sutton focuses on identifying properties which
hold across a broad class of equilibria. Consequently, he emphasizes the single relationship
between concentration and market size, relying only on the toughness of price competition and
the distinction between exogenous and endogenous sunk costs as explanatory variables. Sutton
uses these concepts to place bounds on the set of possible outcomes.
Using this bounds approach (Sutton, 1991), he argues that industries may be grouped into
two types. In the first type, sunk costs are exogenously determined and the minimum level
of concentration decreases to zero as market size increases. Therefore, given a large sample
of such markets, one should observe at least a few large markets with relatively low levels of
concentration. By contrast, in industries where sunk costs are determined endogenously, this
relationship breaks down: as market size expands, the minimum level of concentration is strictly
bounded away from zero. The incentive to escalate spending on fixed outlays scales up with
the size of the market so that "increases in market size will be associated with a rise in fixed
outlays by at least some firms and this effect will be sufficiently strong to exclude an indefinite
decline in the level of concentration" (Sutton, 1991). Sutton argues that forces preventing
fragmentation are most prevalent in industries where consumers' willingness to pay may be
arbitrarily increased through sunk outlays such as advertising (Sutton, 1991) or R&D (Sutton,
1998).
This paper demonstrates how the endogenous sunk cost framework can be empirically tested
using data from retail industries. In practice, testing the predictions of the endogenous sunk
cost framework has proven to be challenge (Schmalensee, 1992; Bresnahan, 1992; Sutton, 1997).
Prior studies, relying on data from manufacturing industries (Sutton, 1991; Robinson and Chi-
ang, 1996; Lyons and Matraves, 1995), focus on either a single industry across a few countries
or several industries within a single country. Because many manufacturing industries serve
national markets, single industry studies provide very few observations. While cross-industry
studies yield a more reasonable number of observations, they require careful (and often flawed)
estimation of cost components, particularly the exogenous component of fixed cost (i.e. mini-
mum efficient scale). This study takes a different approach to the problem by focusing on retail
industries, which are naturally segmented into distinct geographic markets. This allow us to
focus on a single industry with a large number of observations and avoid the direct estimation
of cost components, while holding a score of other unknown or difficult to measure variables
constant. Therefore, retail markets combine the clean properties of the single industry study
with the larger scale available in cross-industry analysis.
This paper focuses on competition in the retail food industry. Although "supermarket"
and "grocery store" are often used as synonyms in newspapers and common speech, they are
in fact distinct industries and are treated as such by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
In particular, the FTC defines a supermarket as a "full-line retail grocery store with annual
sales of at least $2 million that carries a wide variety of food and grocery items" (Baer, 1999).
Grocery stores are defined to be "retail stores other than supermarkets that sell food and
grocery products" with annual sales of less than $2 million.' Note that these are establishment
(store, not firm) level definitions. The distinction between industries is significant because, as
this paper documents, the nature of competition is very different across these industries.
In particular, this paper presents empirical evidence that endogenous sunk costs play a
central role in determining the equilibrium structure of the supermarket industry, but do not
significantly impact the grocery industry. Through a detailed case history of the retail food
industry, I document the innovations (e.g. the invention of the supermarket format, the switch
to self-service, and a decrease in transportation costs) that led to the exit of a large number of
unprofitable firms and increased concentration. The analysis highlights the escalation in both
store size and, to a lesser extent, advertising that differentiated the supermarket industry from
1Examples include neighborhood "mom and pop" grocery stores, convenience stores, and specialty food stores.
These stores do not offer the set of products and services that enable supermarket consumers to "one-stop shop"
for food and grocery products. In addition, supermarkets primarily benchmark their food and grocery prices
using the prices of nearby supermarkets and do not regularly price check products at other types of stores or
change their prices in response to price changes by other types of stores (Baer, 1999).
the smaller (in both store size and total revenue) grocery industry.
This paper then applies the bounds-regression methodology to a large sample of distinct
geographic markets. I document the existence of a large, positive lower boun:d to the four-firm
concentration ratio (C4) in the supermarket industry that asymptotes with increasing market
size to a level above 30%. Using data from 1972 and 1998, I demonstrate that this bound has
remained stable for at least 25 years. Since supermarkets inSuvcst extensively in store size and
product selection and grocery stores compete mostly on the basis of location, the hypothesis
that endogenous sunk cost investment is much more effective in the supermarket industry can
be tested using a comparison of the two industries. Indeed, I find that C4 in the grocery
industry decreases to a level below 10%. While concentration in the grocery industry is not
found to converge to zero, the asymptotic levels predicted constitute a very small degree of
concentration, suggesting the role (if any) of endogenous sunk costs in the grocery industry is
very limited. In contrast, the asymptotic values found in the supermarket industry converge
to a level above 30%, substantially higher than the levels found in the grocery industry. These
results suggest that endogenous sunk costs are an important source of concentration in the
supermarket industry and may be related to competitive efforts to expand product selection
through joint store-firm investments. For example, investments in information technology and
advanced distribution systems link store level investments (e.g. store size) to firm level decisions.
This may help to explain some of motivation for operating a chain of stores. However, moving
beyond suggestive evidence of the sources of endogenous sunk costs in the supermarket industry
and identifying the strategic nature of competition requires a much more detailed dataset than
is available here. Chapter 3 of this thesis employs a dataset consisting of store level observations
to establish that large supermarkets constitute a local natural oligopoly based on competitive
investment in store size.
This paper is organized as follows. I begin with a brief overview of a model of endogenous
sunk cost competition and the testable implications provided. I then present an historical view
of the supermarket industry. The data are discussed in section 4 and the empirical findings
follow in section 5. I conclude with a discussion of the results and topics for future research.
2.2 Sunk Costs and the Lower Bound to Concentration: Sut-
ton's Synthesis
The goal of this section is to provide an overview of Sutton's (1991) bounds approach and en-
dogenous sunk cost (ESC) framework, placing it in the context of prior attempts to understand
market structure and indicating how it can be used to identify the forces governing competition
in the supermarket industry. The bounds approach and the ESC framework extend a long line
of research focusing on the economic forces determining the realized levels of market concentra-
tion. The pioneering case study analysis of Stigler (1949, 1968) gave way to the cross-industry,
theory testing vision of Bain (1951, 1956, 1962), who used a broad run of industries to eval-
uate the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, emphasizing strategic explanations
for high degrees of observed concentration. Demsetz (1974) argued that concentration was the
result of superior capabilities, not strategic behavior; this efficiency explanation was formalized
in the contestability models developed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). Beginning in
the 1980s, a wealth of game theoretic models criticized the strong assumptions of the efficiency
argument. The new focus on precise, game theoretic models produced a large body of "particu-
larizing" theory (Fisher, 1989) where a "tangled web of delicate informational and commitment
opportunities seemed critical to understanding how individual firm strategies would play out in
equilibrium" (Bresnahan, 1992). This highly specific theory led to detailed statistical studies
of specific industries (Bresnahan (1989) provides an excellent review), which created a wealth
of stylized facts (Schmalensee, 1989) and the cynical criticism that "anything can happen."
Sutton (1991) extends the work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) and Berry (1992), which shifts
the focus to identifying propositions that hold across a broad set of equilibria. Because the
"right" model is rarely obvious and many models involve multiple equilibria, making general
claims that hold across a broad run of industries requires identifying "strong" mechanisms that
hold across entire classes of models.2 Understanding the primary determinants of market struc-
2For example, specific models may allow for extensive variation in the type (or toughness) of competition, the
nature of entry (e.g. sequential or simulatanous), the equilibrium selection mechanism, the role of information,
and the nature of players' beliefs. The point of focusing on strong mechanisms is to identify properties that hold
in all of these cases.
ture is interesting both in its own right and for how it might inform competition policy.3 To
begin unpacking the determinants of market structure, it is necessary to first understand the
relationship between equilibrium price and the number of entrants.
The notion that equilibrium concentration should fall with market size is in no sense novel.
Indeed, in a simple economic model with both fixed and marginal costs, firms will only enter
as long as they can profitably cover fixed costs (up to an integer constraint). Therefore, larger
markets, with more consumers over which to spread fixed costs, will support a greater number
of firms. Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990) apply this logic to conclude that if both price
and total industry profit fall with entry (the price-competition effect), the number of entrants
should increase less than proportionately with the size of the market. 4 If price competition did
not intensify with entry (and profits were the same), the number of entrants would be propor-
tional to market size. Therefore, the direct result of price competition is higher equilibrium
concentration. The authors quantify the price-competition effect by estimating what they call
the threshold market sizes at which entry by an additional firm becomes profitable. Looking at
a sample of geographically isolated (rural) markets, they find that entry indeed increases less
than proportionately with market size. but that the price-competition effect is exhausted with
3-5 entrants, after which market size and the number of entrants increase proportionately.
Drawing on the central insight of the Demsetz critique (Demsetz, 1974), Berry (1992) ex-
plores an alternative explanation for the "less than proportionate" increase: that more efficient
firms enter first. Using a dataset of airline firms operating in city pairs and a clever simulation
estimator, Berry conducts an exercise similar to Bresnahan and Reiss while also controlling for
firm heterogeneity. Although he finds that heterogeneity is significant, his results are consistent
with a strong price-competition effect. Together, these papers provide strong empirical evidence
for the stylized fact (Schmalensee, 1989) that price falls with increased entry and that tougher
price competition is consistent with higher equilibrium concentration. This finding forms one
of the basic assumptions of the Sutton framework.
While both Bresnahan and Reiss and Berry focus on the relationship between market size
3 For example, attempts to increase competition by limiting seller concentration are only warranted if concen-
trated equilibria are the product of weak competition.
4Since profits are lower when a second (third, fourth, etc.) firm enters the market, the size of the market
required to profitably sustain two firms is greater than twice the size of the market required to sustain a monopoly.
and fixed costs, Sutton (1991) substantially broadens both the scope and generality of this
empirical work by organizing his analysis around the distinction between exogenous and en-
dogenous sunk costs, and their impact on the single empirical relationship between market size
and equilibrium concentration.5 Sutton specifies a model where firms, operating within the
context of a multi-stage game, choose levels of fixed and sunk costs,6 and then, having made
these investments, compete in a final stage price game. Specifically, competition takes place in
two stages. In the first stage, firms choose whether to enter and incur a fixed and sunk cost F.
In the second stage (price competition), firms earn profit S7r, where S denotes market size and
7 is a function of the products entered (and fixed costs incurred) by all the firms in stage 1.
Sutton (1997) establishes the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Non-fragmentation (Sutton, 1997)
Suppose: for some constants 5 > 0 and K > 1, a firm that spends K times as much as any
rival on fixed outlays will earn a final stage payoff no less than 6S;
Then: there is a lower bound to concentration (as measured by the maximal share of the
largest firm), which is independent of the size of the market.
Proof. see Sutton (1997) 0
Stated more loosely, "as market size increases, the incentives to escalate spending on fixed
outlays rises. Increases in market size will be associated with a rise in fixed outlays by at least
scme firms and this effect will be sufficiently strong to exclude an indefinite decline in the level
of concentration" (Sutton, 1997). This escalation mechanism (Sutton, 1991) follows from the
fact that the relative increase that a firm can achieve through an increase in fixed outlays is
correspondingly greater as each firm's market share is relatively smaller. The lower bound to
concentration depends on the degree to which escalations in fixed outlays increase profits in the
final stage (measured by the ratio 7 = ). In industries where 6 (and thus y) equals zero, the
5Sutton makes several contributions to this literature. First, he formalizes the intuition that concentration
may fall indefinitely as market size increases. He illustrates this fragmentation result using a model of competition
that relies only on the assumption that profit per firm decreases with entry. Second, he identifies conditions under
which the fragmentation result fails so that equilibrium concentration remains bounded above zero regardless of
how large the market becomes. Using an alternative specification, Shaked and Sutton (1983) identify conditions
under which no further entry will occur beyond a certain market size, resulting in a "natural oligopoly" consisting
of a finite number of firms.
6These sunk costs might take the form of a new plant, a new product, R&D expenditures, advertising or a
host of other quality enhancing sunk investments.
lower bound to concentration will tend to zero as market size expands, but industries for which
-y lies above some minimal positive value have concentration levels which are bounded below. In
these non-zero 7y industries, firms are able to "enhance consumers' willingness-to-pay for a given
product...by way of a proportional increase in fixed costs" (Sutton, 1991). These industries,
where concentration remains strictly positive regardless of the size of the market, are classified
as endogenous sunk cost industries. Conversely, industries where 7 = 0 (sunk outlays do not
increase willingness-to-pay) are classified as exogenous sunk cost industries. More generally,
Schmalensee (1992) demonstrates for an industry to exhibit endogenous sunk cost behavior,
"what does seem to be necessary is that market share be sufficiently sensitive to variations in
fixed costs, so that rivalry is both tough and focused on fixed outlays, not on per-unit price-cost
margins." Therefore, any sunk outlay which increases consumers willingness to pay in the final
stage is an endogenous sunk cost. Sutton and subsequent authors have focused on advertising
and R&D as the main examples.7
A somewhat more subtle insight developed by Sutton concerns his emphasis on identifying
the lower bound to concentration, rather than predicting the precise level of concentration
corresponding to a given market size. As stated, the non-fragmentation theorem simply puts
bounds on the outcomes which can be sustained as equilibria. This lack of precision is a product
of the theory's breadth. What occurs above the bound varies dramatically depending on the
specifics of the model chosen. In particular, Sutton emphasizes that, while specific models may
yield unique predictions, those predictions depend critically on the parameters of the models
chosen, resulting in a variety of "point" predictions associated with different specifications.
Allowing variation in the form of competition, type of equilibrium, sequence of entry, and role
of information will lead to several distinct outcomes. The central insight of Sutton's approach
is that, for a broad class of models, it is possible to place bounds on the set of these "point"
predictions.
To fix ideas, it is necessary to focus on a few specific examples. Consider a simple model
where products are homogenous and the type (toughness) of competition is the same across
7The endogenous sunk cost mechanism is nicely illustrated using the example of computer microchip produc-
tion. To produce faster microprocessors or memory chips with larger capacity it is necessary to invest in large,
state of the art fabrication plants, without increasing marginal costs. Since chips are valued almost exclusively
on speed or capacity, a manufacturer can increase consumers' willingness to pay by increasing its sunk outlays.
Therefore, it should not be surprising that chip sales are concentrated among only a few large firms.
Exogenous
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Figure 2-1: The relationship between concentration and market size.
markets. Shaked and Sutton (1987) demonstrate that, in this case, each market size yields a
unique equilibrium. Therefore, there is a unique mapping from market size to concentration.
However, the relationship between market size and concentration depends critically on the type
of sunk costs required to compete in the industry. This dependence is illustrated in the left
panels of Figure 2-1. Equilibrium concentration in industries with exogenous sunk costs tends
to zero as market size increases. In contrast, equilibrium concentration in endogenous sunk
cost industries (^y > 0) tends to a strictly positive value (compare the figure in the upper left
corner to the figure in the lower left corner). In both of these cases, the figure illustrates the
actual level of concentration, not a lower bound. Therefore, empirical studies of homogeneous
industries should (in theory) uncover a tight, functional relationship between concentration
and size. However, few industries have so simple a structure. At least some degree of product
differentiation exists in most every industry, as do differences in price competition and the
sequence of entry. When the analysis is extended to include horizontally (for example spatially)
differentiated products for example, the tightness of these predictions are weakened.
When markets are spatially differentiated, as in the case of most retail markets, we are
unable to determine if the equilibrium chosen will consist of several firms each operating a
single plant or a few firms operating several plants, even if the plants owned by each type of
firm operate at minimum efficient scale (Shaked and Sutton, 1990). This indeterminacy is a
direct result of multiple equilibria and the issue impacts any differentiated products market.
Whether one firm produces many products or several firms produce a few products is simply a
particular choice among multiple equilibria.8 More precise predictions cannot be made without
putting more structure on the problem. The key insight of the bounds approach lies in identi-
fying properties which hold across a class of models, irrespective of the specific choice among
non-unique equilibria. This intuition applies not only to the product differentiation example
considered here, but also to variation in the form of entry, type of competition, and the role of
information (Sutton, 1991).
The non-fragmentation theorem in fact provides a strong prediction: in industries character-
ized by endogenous sunk costs, there i. a lower bound to concentration. This prediction holds
across a broad class of models. To illustrate this prediction, let C(S) be a function mapping
each market size to the least concentrated equilibria consistent with a market of size S. In
exogenous sunk cost industries, the lower bound function C(S) decreases indefinitely as market
size S expands, whereas in endogenous sunk cost industries, C(S) remains strictly positive as
market size increases. While we cannot predict what will occur above the bound, we may rule
out outcomes which lie below it. Both of these cases are represented in the right panels of Fig-
ure 2-1, which illustrate how the bounds approach rules out equilibria below the lower bound,
while placing no restrictions on behavior above it. The entire set of points above the bounds in
the right panels of Figure 2-1 are feasible outcomes - only points below the bounds are ruled
out. This contrasts sharply with the exogenous sunk cost case (represented in the left panels
of Figure 2-1), in which the precise level of concentration is determined for each market size.9
Variation in the toughness of price competition across markets further justifies focusing
80f course, if there are cost advantages to offering several products (stores), then more concentrated equi-
libria will be favored. However, since even these cost advantages presumably have a limit, horizontal product
differentiation (HPD) alone will not prevent an industry from fragmenting beyond some market size (Shaked and
Sutton, 1990).
9 We can summarize the main contributions of Sutton's research on market structure as a) identifying a
second "strong" mechanism (that in the presence of endogenous sunk costs, the tendency for markets to become
indefinitely fragmented breaks down) and b) demonstrating that within a general framework, we can only place
bounds on the set of possible outcomes.
on the lower bound to a set of feasible equilibria. Restated within the context of the bounds
approach, Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) demonstrates that, when entry intensifies price com-
petition, the lower bound to concentration is higher than if entry had no effect on price (or
profit). Sutton (1991) extends this intuition to include the effect of any exogenous influence
(e.g. transportation costs, regulation) that intensifies price competition or alters the struc-
ture of the underlying game. Sutton's approach is motivated by the existence of unobservable
factors such as information asymmetries, equilibrium selection mechanisms, and agent belief
structures. He exploits the fact that, just as with entry by additional firms, changes in these
factors simply shift the functional relationship between price and profit. In the context of price
competition, increasing the toughness of competition reduces the ex post gains from entry and
leads to more concentrated equilibria by shifting the lower bound to concentration C(S) up,
but has no impact on its asymptotic level (Figure 2-2). Specifically, Cournot competition will
lead to higher equilibrium concentration for all market sizes than joint profit maximization. On
the other hand, an increase in horizontal product differentiation, which reduces the intensity of
price competition, shifts the lower bound down. However, the central prediction of Theorem 1
continues to hold. Concentration in an endogenous sunk cost industry with softer price com-
petition will still be bounded above zero, the bound C(S) will simply be lower (closer to the
horizontal axis) than in an industry with tougher price competition. Similarly, if an exogenous
sunk cost industry experiences a sudden increase in the intensity of price competition, the lower
bound will shift up, resulting in higher equilibrium concentration at all market sizes, but C(S)
will still converge to zero as market size expands. Clearly, if the toughness of price competition
varies across markets, we will only be able to identify a lower bound to the set of possible
outcomes. Finally, increases in the (exogenous) fixed cost of entry have the same effect as an
increase in the intensity of competition. Because the cost that a firm must i 'cover to break
even is higher, fewer firms will "fit" into a given market size, increasing the overall level of
concentration.
While prior applications of the bounds methodology have focused almost exclusively on
cross-national differences in manufacturing industries, the methodology can be applied to any
set of markets which a) operate according to similar underlying economic forces, but b) vary
by size and the number of entrants. In particular, retail industries, such as the grocery and
Concentration
Figure 2-2: The effect of an increase in the intensity of price competition.
supermarket industries, provide an attractive application. By focusing on these industries, this
study identifies the economic drivers of concentration in these industries (exogenous versus
endogenous sunk costs) and provides insight into the generality of Sutton's approach.
Specifically, due to their competitive investment in both advertising and store size, I argue
that supermarkets are an example of an endogenous sunk cost industry, while grocery stores,
which do not significantly invest in either, are not. Therefore, a testable implication of the
model is that the effect of endogenous sunk cost competition will be much more substantial in
the supermarket industry. In particular, if the impact of sunk investment on profit is indeed
larger in the supermarket industry, the non-fragmentation result should be more pronounced
in this industry.
Both the sufermarket and grocery industries are spatially and horizontally differentiated,1o
compete in ways that undoubtedly vary by market, and are unlikely to face the same entry
conditions across markets." Consequently, when we plot concentration versus market size, we
10A supermarket chain is simply an example of a firm with several plants operating at minimum efficient scale
(MES), while an independent is a single plant firm which may or may not be operating at MES. Supermarkets and
grocery stores also sell differentiated products: store layouts and the products offered are tailored to different
consumer groups. The degree of both types of differentiation is likely to vary both by region and over time
depending on transportation costs, population density, income, and other factors.
"For example, newer markets are more likely to have seen simulataneous entry by large, established super-
Size
should expect to find a cloud of points. Sutton developed the bounds approach precisely to
handle this issue. The testable restrictions will be on the bounds constraining these scatters
of points: conccntration will only be bounded above zero in the presence of endogenous sunk
costs. Specifically, the lowest level of concentration for the supermarket industry should be
significantly higher than the lowest level of concentration for the grocery industry. Moreover,
using a detailed case history, we should be able to identify both the escalation mechanism
(increasing investment in sunk outlays by a small subset of firms) and the impact of the price-
competition effect (exit by under-performing firms) in the historical development of the industry.
I turn to this exercise in the following section.
2.3 A historical overview of the supermarket industry
Because the sunk cost framework relies on a game-theoretic approach to explain market struc-
ture, case history evidence can play a significant role in evaluating its claims. In particular, the
framework provides implications about how firms will react to changes in market conditions.
When conditions change over time, case histories allow us to observe how firms react. 12 Ac-
cording to Sutton (1997), "the empirical content lies in the claim that certain outcomes will not
be observed, and the model of necessity provides us with a qualitative description of the kind
of deviation which will be profitable in such a configuration." If the importance of endogenous
sunk costs increases, the escalation process should be accompanied by rising advertising (or
other sunk cost) to sales ratios, falling profit to sales ratios, and exit by unprofitable firms
resulting in a more concentrated equilibrium structure.
Examining both the supermarket and grocery industries, I find that only the development
of the supermarket industry in the 1950s follows this pattern; exit by small firms together with
massive increases in both store size and the array of products offered resulted in large increases
in local concentration. This contrasts with the (earlier) development of the grocery industry,
brought on by the chain store revolution. Although concentration did increase sharply with the
introduction of the chain store, there is no evidence that competition was focused on sunk costs.
market chains, while some older markets have been served by the same dominant chain for decades.
12For example, Greif (1993) and Genesove and Mullin (1998) use case history evidence to evaluate the predic-
tions of game theoretic models
While the falling costs of storage and transportation may have increases economies of scale and
the toughness of price competition, the focus of competition remained price-cost margins, not
sunk outlays. Accordingly, while many markets became concentrated, it is likely that some
markets remained quite unconcentrated during the grocery era. The focus of competition
shifted with the introduction of the supermarket format, which greatly changed the nature of
the product offered to consumers. Firms began competing in store size and product offerings
and local concentration increased dramatically.
From 1880 to the present, the retail food industry evolved from the general store, which
operated on a premise of low turnover and high margins, to a mixture of modern supermarkets,
operating on a premise of wide variety, high turnover and low margins, and grocery stores,
offering convenience (often in the form of proximity) at the expense of both price and variety.
There were two periods of major change: 1910-1930 (the rise of the chain stores) and 1930-1960
(the introduction of the supermarket).
The first major change in the industrial structure of the retail food industry was the chain
store revolution (Adelman, 1959; Progressive Grocer, 1995). The chain stores, led by A&P,
gained a cost advantage over independent stores by integrating backward into wholesaling and
manufacturing. Due at least in part to decreases in transportation costs, chains were able to
create a large network of stores that could take advantage of quantity discounts on the products
they didn't make themselves and economies of scale on self-produced items (Tedlow, 1990). The
chain stores also benefited from the scale economies associated with information processing
(Tedlow, 1990). The large number of stores and intricate distribution network allowed the
chains to centralize accounting and better forecast demand, resulting in more efficient inventory
management and site selection. These cost savings were passed through to consumers in the
form of lower prices. Various price studies performed in the late 1920s and early 1930s found
that chain store prices were 4.5-14% lower than their independent counterparts (Tedlow, 1990).
Concentration also rose sharply. Between 1919 and 1932, the share of the top 5 firms in the
U.S. increased from 4.2% to 28.8%, and the share of all chain stores (firms operating four or
more stores) increased to over 35% (Lebhar, 1952).
Although substantial changes occurred over this period in all segments of the economy, the
structural changes in the food industry seem to have been driven by two factors. First, the
fixed (exogenous) cost of entry seems to have increased substantially so that the minimum
efficient scale was no longer a single store, but a chain of stores (Lebhar, 1952). Second, the
fall in transportation costs intensified competition among stores, as evidenced by falling prices
(Tedlow, 1990). While the Sutton model would suggest that each of these changes will lead to
an upward shift in the lower bound to concentration, neither will affect the asymptotic behavior
of the lower bound (see Figure 2-2).
To see why operating a chain of grocery stores did not involve endogenous sunk outlays,
it is important to understand exactly how scale impacted the food industry. In order to take
advantage of scale economies, it was not necessary that stores be jointly owned (though it was
clearly feasible). By joining a cooperative or simply purchasing from a large wholesaler, small
stores could take advantage of quantity discounts as well. In fact, although the distribution
system they employed was quite new, the physical stores operated by the chains were not
much different from their independent counterparts: delivery and credit were common in many
locations and consumers were still served by a clerk who would retrieve items and suggest others
(Tedlow, 1990). The chains also did not significantly advertise or build larger stores. Their
main advantage was a distribution system introduced first by the chains and later adopted by
independents. Furthermore, building a distribution center and operating trucks is certainly a
fixed cost, but probably not a sunk one. The escalating level of sunk outlays consistent with
a shift to endogenous sunk cost competition was absent from the development of the grocery
industry. From the perspective of the sunk cost framework, the chain store revolution may
have simply intensified price competition among stores, rather than leading to endogenous
sunk cost competition. It also greatly increased the number of equilibria which could occur in
any given market as firms could now own any number of stores. If this is in fact the case, we
should observe rising concentration, consistent with an upward shift of the lower bound (and
increasing heterogeneity above the bound), but the lower bound should still decrease to zero as
market size expands.
While detailed micro data on the structure of the retail food industry are not available prior
to 1929, it is still possible to form a picture of the overall market structure using aggregate
data and a few specific examples. For example, the dramatic increase in market share of the
top 5 firms (their share of sales increased from 4.2% in 1919 to 28.8% in 1932 (Lebhar, 1952)
indicates that concentration grew substantially prior to 1929. By 1929, the market share of
all chain stores (firms operating 4 or more stores) reached 38.5% (Lebhar, 1952). This share
remained stable (at around 38%) until well after the introduction of the supermarket format in
the 1930s (Lebhar, 1952). Clearly, the chain store revolution dramatically increased the overall
level of concentration. However, it seems clear that the increase in concentration was consistent
with either the price-competition effect, an increase in exogenous sunk costs, or the increasing
multiplicity of feasible equilibria (or a combination of the three), but not with the introduction
of endogenous sunk costs. To establish this point directly, we need to observe the asymptotic
behavior of the lower bound to concentration.
Unfortunately, detailed market share data is only available for a single firm, A&P. However,
the ad hoc decision to focus on only a single firm to document equilibrium market structure
of the entire industry is mitigated somewhat by the fact that A&P played such a dominant
role in the grocery industry during this period (Adelman, 1959). In particular, A&P's share
of national sales was 16.4% in 1931, while the next 4 largest chains only accounted for an
additional 12.1% (Lebhar, 1952). The combined market share of all other chains (more than
four stores) accounted for only an additional 10%. Furthermore, historical evidence indicates
that no other chain had a national presence anywhere approaching that of A&P (Adelman,
1959). Therefore, A&P was likely market leader in almost every market in which it competed
and thus, despite the fact that data on local concentration is not available for this time period,
we can establish a reasonable picture of the structure of local markets by using A&P's share
of local markets as a proxy for the share of the largest firm. Nonetheless, these results should
be viewed with a degree of skepticism as this exercise would be completely misleading if A&P
were not such a dominant firm. Adelman (1959) presents A&P's share of overall sales in 43
cities for 1932. Figure 2-3 shows the relationship between concentration and market size for
these markets. For this set of markets, A&P's share of total sales actually appears constant
in market size, suggesting that concentration was not so much related to scale as to the choice
among multiple equilibria stemming from thc ability to operate any number of stores. The
existence of several relatively unconcentrated small markets is inconsistent with the presence
of substantial (exogenous or endogenous) sunk costs.
While the rise of the grocery store seems relatively disconnected from statistically conse-
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Figure 2-3: Market share of A&P (1932)
quential endogenous sunk cost investment (e.g. operating a chain of grocery stores did not
require any significant sunk outlays and there is no evidence of rising levels of sunk outlays
among these firms), the formation and growth of the supermarket industries revolves directly
around such investments. Consider first the "inventor" of the supermarket format, Michael
Cullen, of the now defunct King Kullen supermarket chain. In 1930, Cullen brought a proposal
to his employers at Kroger (the second largest grocery chain) detailing his plan for a new breed
of huge, cash only, non-delivery, self-service stores. These new super stores would be located
on the outskirts of town to take advantage of low rents. Furthermore, these stores would sell a
wide variety of nationally advertised, branded goods and would advertise heavily. His proposal
called for ½% of sales (20% of net profit) to be spent on advertising. Cullen's plan was to
operate on low margins and low expenses, making up the difference on volume. Unlike the
price reducing scale economies inherent in the chain store formula, Cullen changed the nature
of the store itself, introducing a new, vertically differentiated product. His most important
changes were increased store size (5 times larger), suburban location, the shift to self-service,
and advertising. 13 The introduction of the supermarket format coincided with growth in na-
13Cullen's proposal was ultimately rejected by his supervisors at Kroger, prompting him to form his own chain
tionally advertised brands which the chains, who were heavily invested in their own brands,
often refused to carry. The popularity of national brands reduced the cost advantage of vertical
integration into manufacturing.
Again, transportation costs played a central role, along with decreased storage costs. The
spread of the automobile and paved highways facilitated the supermarkets' strategy of locating
on the outskirts of town. Advances in refrigeration allowed shoppers to make fewer trips by
stocking up while the retailers themselves faced lower storage costs.14 The invention of the
shopping cart helped facilitate bulk purchases. Clearly, these changes in transportation and
storage represented a large decrease in the degree of locational differentiation, as consumers
now had several alternative outlets to frequent. However, the introduction of the supermar-
ket represented a dramatic change in the cost structure of the retail food industry. Firms
were now building stores that could not easily be converted and resold for other uses. The
desire to accommodate a larger variety of products increased the degree to which investment
was sunk. Furthermore, as stocking a large array of products intensified the need to invest
in information technology, a connection was established between store and firm level invest-
ment. The introduction of the supermarket essentially created a new industry, built largely on
investments consistent with endogenous sunk costs. Over time the supermarket and grocery
segments became increasingly distinct, with supermarkets becoming the primary food providers
while grocery stores evolved into convenience stores and corner stores that captured a much
smaller portion of the overall food market.
The rise of the supermarket industry carries the fingerprint of the endogenous sunk cost
escalation mechanism: falling margins, escalating sunk outlays, and the appearance of a lower
bound to concentration which remains strictly positive as market size increases. With the
introduction of the supermarket format, margins began to fall in the retail food industry (Table
1).15 The falling margins were accompanied by the exit of a large number of stores (Tables
2 & 3), as single store firms exited the market and multi-store firms either exited or closed
of supermarkets, King Kullen. The supermarket format was later adopted by Kroger when it became obvious
that the supermarket would become the dominant format.
14In fact, the supermarket format had been introduced without success much earlier (1910-20) in a few cities,
but it was not until shoppers were able to make larger, less frequent trips that the format thrived (Tedlow, 1990).
15Since the introduction of the supermarket coincided with the Great Depression, we should not overemphasize
the importance of falling profits.
old grocery stores to open new supermarkets. Both the number of supermarket stores and the
market share of supermarket firms grew considerably throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Table
3). The growth of the supermarket industry was accompanied by a rapid growth in both the
average store size and the average number of products carried per store (Table 4). Advertising,
which increased sharply with the introduction of the supermarket, remained thereafter at the
same levels. 16 Although the grocery industry also experienced a substantial exit of firms, it
was not accompanied by either escalating store size or increasing advertising levels. By 1972,
the average C4 (across 263 MSAs) in the grocery industry was 25.4% with a minimum value of
8.6%, compared to 69.5% and 34.5% respectively in the supermarket industry.
However, beyond these averages, the principal insight into market structure lies in the
overall distribution of equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, how did the introduction of the
supermarket format impact the lower bound to concentration? Unfortunately, separate data on
the two industries is not available prior to 1972. Figures 2-4 and 2-5 present plots of C4 versus
market size (measured by the log of population) for the combined industry for 1954 and 1963.
Concentration is clearly bounded above zero in both years, suggesting that the convergence
mechanism had broken down in at least one of these industries by 1954. The degree to which
endogenous sunk costs impacted each industry is addressed in section 2.5, in which separate
lower bounds to concentration are estimated for each industry for 1972.
To summarize, although the chain store revolution dramatically increased concentration in
the grocery industry, there is little evidence linking the rise of the chain stores to any substantial
investment in sunk outlays. The chain stores offered essentially the same product as their
independent counterparts, albeit at lower prices. However, the independent stores were able to
narrow the price margin by forming cooperative buying associations. There is no evidence of
investment in quality enhancing sunk costs by either set of firms, and the increasing levels of
concentration appear to be the product of tougher price competition and a greater multiplicity of
equilibria. On the other hand, the creation of the supermarket format introduced a new, higher
quality product requiring substantial investment in both advertising and store size. The shift
of competitive focus onto sunk outlays is reflected in the rising number of products offered, the
dramatic increase in store sizes, the exit of large numbers of smaller firms, and the appearance
16The advertising/sales ratio is still about 1.5% (Adweek, 1998).
of a positive lower bound to concentration. We turn to the formal test of the significance of
this lower bound in section 2.5.
Table 1
Top 4 Profits
Year Gross Margin
1931 21.5
1932 22.1
1933 22.8
1934 21.7
1935 20.2
1936 19.9
1937 19.2
1938 19.6
1939 19.3
1940 18.1
1941 17.3
1942 15.9
1943 15.8
1944 16.1
Source: Lebhar, 1952.
Table 2
Grocery Store Firm Types
Year Grocery Stores Single-Store Firms Multi-Store Firms
1939 387,000 334,000 53,000
1948 378,000 347,000 31,000
1954 279,000 254,000 25,000
1958 260,000 235,000 25,000
1963 245,000 215,000 30,000
Source: Lebhar, 1952.
The unit of observation in all three columns is the store.
Table 3
Total Foodstores
386,900
259,756
218,130
175,820
162,000
150,000
140,000
126,000
Supermarket Share
Supermarkets Supermarket Share of Sales
NA 18.3%
15,282 46.9%
23,808 62.6%
33,120 76.3%
28,950 71.7%
30,400 73.0%
30,670 74.9%
30,300 76.7%
Grinnel et al., 1979.
Year
1939
1958
1967
1977
1982
1987
1991
1997
Source:
Grinnel 
et al., 1979.
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Figure 2-4: Concentration in the retail food industry, 1954.
Table 4
Product Proliferation and Increasing Store Size
Year Items per Store Store Size
1964 6,900 NA
1970 7,800 NA
1975 8,974 12,290
1980 14,145 12,759
1985 17,459 18,066
1990 30,000 20,797
1998 NA 28,155
Source: Messinger and Chakravarthi (1995) and Progressive Grocer.
2.4 Data
I now turn to the central empirical exercises of this paper: documenting the impact of endoge-
nous sunk costs on the structure of the supermarket industry by establishing the existence of a
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Figure 2-5: Concentration in the retail food industry, 1963.
positive lower bound to concentration. This is accomplished by using datasets from the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and Trade Dimensions to estimate the asymptotic behavior of the
lower bound. The key pieces of data required are, for a cross section of markets, a measure of
concentration and a measure of market size. For market size, each market is defined to be a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). This definition has been widely used in previous stud-
ies of the supermarket industry (Chevalier, (1995, 1996); Cotterill and Haller, 1991; Cotterill,
(1986, 1999)), in trade journals, and by the FTC in assessing merger activity (Baer, 1999). Its
choice is justified by the fact that supermarket chains operate divisions and distribute at the
MSA level, distribute advertising circulars at the MSA level, and consider their competitors to
be firms operating in the same MSA (Chevalier, 1995). Nevertheless, a variety of alternative
market definitions (IRI market, Nielsen market, State, County), measures of size (population
density, sales volume), and measures of concentration (C1, herfindahl) were tested.'17 In order
to assess the stability of the lower bound to concentration over time, I collected data for two
time periods, 1972 and 1998. A single source was not available. The data for 1972 come from
17 The comparisons were performed using the 1998 dataset only, because the FTC dataset does not permit
different aggregation of the data (apart from the MSA). The results for 1998 were broadly similar using a variety
of market definitions and measures of concentration.
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and cover both the supermarket and grocery industries.
The MSA is the only market definition provided in this dataset. The data for 1998 were ob-
tained from the marketing firm Trade Dimensions. This dataset covers only the supermarket
industry, but can be grouped according to any market definition.
The data on the supermarket and grocery store industry in 1972 were obtained from the
FTC report "Grocery Retailing Concentration in Metropolitan Areas, Economic Census Years
1954-72" (summary statistics are in Table 5). The data presented in the FTC report are drawn
from special tabulations of the Census of Manufacturers, which contains the market share and
store and firm counts for all grocery and supermarket firms in 263 metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs). Thus, for each MSA we observe the number of grocery stores (establishments) and
grocery firms, and the number of supermarket stores (establishments) and firms, as well as the
share of sales accounted for by the four largest grocery firms and the four largest supermarket
firms (C4 ). C4 for the grocery industry includes only grocery firms in the calculation of total
sales and C4 for the supermarket industry includes only supermarket firms. Stores are classified
at the establishment level as supermarkets or grocery stores depending on whether their annual
sales volume is greater or less than $1 million. This cutoff was the accepted standard within
the grocery industry in 1972 (Manchester, 1992). Market shares are calculated at the firm level.
Although a single firm could operate stores of both types (grocery and supermarket), it is not
a frequent occurrence, especially among large chains. The larger supermarket chains tend to
operate stores which are well above the cutoff, whereas the largest grocery firms are convenience
store chains, whose stores are below the cutoff. Population is drawn from the 1960 and 1970
census.
Table 5
1972 Variables
Variable Definition Mean S.D.
C4 Grocery C4 for grocery firms by MSA 25.6 10.9
C4 Supermarkets C4 for supermarket firms by MSA 69.5 13.9
Population Population in thousands 562.4 1039.4
Grocery Stores Number of grocery stores 355.1 599.4
Supermarket Stores Number of supermarket stores 74.6 127.4
Grocery Firms Number of Grocery firms 342.6 606.4
Supermarket Firms Number of supermarket firms 24.6 32.4
Source: Federal Trade Commission.
The data on supermarket concentration in 1998 was obtained directly from Trade Dimen-
sions, which collects information from supermarkets operating in 317 MSAs in the United States
(summary statistics are in Table 6). They do not collect information onil grocery stores. Trade
Dimensions define a supermarket as "any full-line, self-service food store with an annual sales
volume of $2 million or more." The $2 million dollar cutoff corresponds to the standard cur-
rently used by trade journals, industry associations, and the FTC (it was increased from $1
million in 1980 (Manchester, 1992)). Given the rate of inflation over the last 25 years, the
definitions are roughly comparable. Although Trade Dimensions collects information on all the
supermarkets operating in the U.S., to facilitate the comparison across years, the analysis here
is restricted to only those operating in a designated MSA. As with the FTC data, the market
will be defined to be an MSA and concentration will be measured by C4. The boundaries of
several MSAs have changed since 1972. However, the current analysis does not track the de-
velopment of markets over time, only the relationship between market size and structure. For
this reason, I have not attempted to create a subsample of markets which maintained the same
boundaries, choosing instead to present the full set of markets.
Table 6
1998 Variables
Variable Definition Mean S.D.
C4 Supermarkets C4 for supermarket firms by MSA 78.8 11.4
Population Population in thousands 659.2 1090
Supermarket Stores Number of supermarket stores 68.8 101.7
Supermarket Firms Number of supermarket firms 9.4 4.9
Source: Trade Dimensions.
From Table 5, it is clear that the supermarket industry is far more concentrated than the
grocery industry. Indeed, the average number of grocery firms is close to the average number of
stores, suggesting the existence of a large number of single store firms. This is clearly not the
case in the supermarket industry, which is also served by far fewer stores. Finally, a comparison
across years reveals that although the level of concentration and average number of stores have
remained relatively stable, the number of firms decreased substantially, possibly reflecting the
merger activity of the 1980s (Chevalier, 1995) and the exit of under-performing firms.
2.5 The Lower Bound to Concentration
Sutton's framework provides strong predictions concerning the relationship between market
size and equilibrium concentration levels. In industries where the levels of sunk cost are exoge-
nously determined, the minimum level of concentration (the lower bound C(S)) will continue
to decrease indefinitely as market size expands. In industries where these costs are endoge-
nously determined, the minimum level of concentration will remain strictly positive as market
size expands (C(S) converges to a positive value as S -+ c0). In the context of Theorem 1,
fragmentation or its absence depends on the degree to which escalation in sunk costs increases
profits in the final stage (measured by the parameter 7-y). However, because there is no obvi-
ous way to estimate the effectiveness of sunk investments in increasing willingness-to-pay (7-y),
we cannot directly predict the asymptotic value of the lower bound C(S). Sutton (1991) and
subsequent authors address this issue by assuming that for some group of (advertising or R&D
intensive) industries, 7 lies above some minimal positive level. Sutton (1991) divides industries
on the basis of the advertising to sales ratio. Since sunk outlays are assumed to increase con-
sumers willingness-to-pay in advertising intensive industries, under the maintained hypothesis
concentration in a pooled sample of those industries will remain strictly positive regardless of
the size of the market. This prediction may then be tested both by visual inspection of the
observed relationship between concentration and market size (using scatter plots) and by em-
pirically estimating the lower bound function C(S). Our analysis follows Sutton's approach. If
competition in the supermarket industry is focused on quality enhancing sunk costs (-7 > 0),
then a pooled sample of distinct geographic markets will have a lower bound to concentration
which remains strictly positive regardless of the size of the market. The grocery industry, which
we assume to have 7-y close or equal to zero, should have a lower bound which converges to zero.
Empirically testing the predictions of the endogenous sunk cost framework requires choosing
a candidate industry or set of industries. Previous studies, relying on data from manufacturing
industries (Sutton, 1991; Robinson and Chiang, 1996; Lyons and Matraves, 1995), focus on
either a single industry across a few countries or several industries within a single country.
Because many manufacturing industries serve national markets, single industry studies provide
very few observations. While cross-industry studies yield a more reasonable number of obser-
vations, they require careful (and often flawed) estimation of cost components, particularly the
exogenous component of fixed cost.18 This study takes a different approach to the problem
by focusing on retail markets, which are naturally segmented into distinct geographic markets.
This allows us to focus on a single industry with a large number of observations and avoid
directly estimating cost components, while holding a score of other unknown or difficult to
measure variables constant. As such, retail markets combine the clean properties of the single
industry study with the larger scale available in cross-industry analysis.
The analysis proceeds in 2 stages. First, scatter plots depicting the realized levels of con-
centration allow us to visually inspect the differences between the supermarket and grocery
industries. Concentration is indeed much higher in the supermarket industry, and there is no
evidence of a negative correlation between market size and concentration. This is not the case
81sIn Sutton's empirical work, market size is measured by population divided by the fixed cost of entry, which
is approximated by an engineering estimate of minimum efficient scale (MES). This exercise involves significant
effort and potential for error. While this adjustment is necessary in cross-industry analyses (since the level of
set-up costs affects the shape of the lower bound), MES is arguably constant within a particular industry so that
single industry studies are less sensitive to this adjustment.
in the grocery industry. The stability of the structure of the supermarket industry over time is
established by comparing the market structure in 1972 to the structure in 1998.
Both sets of results support the presence of a large, positive lower bound to concentration
in the supermarket industry, suggesting that competition is indeed focused on endogenous sunk
costs. The lower bound is over four times larger in the supermarket industry than in the grocery
industry, suggesting that endogenous costs play a much smaller (if any) role in that industry.
2.5.1 Scatter Plots
Figures 2-6 and 2-7 show the relationship between the four-firm concentration ratio (C'4) and
market size for the grocery and supermarket industries respectively in 1972. In both cases,
we observe a range of concentration levels. This is not surprising, given that both industries
provide differentiated products. The toughness of price competition and degree of horizontal
differentiation are also likely to vary by region.
In the grocery industry (Figure 2-6), there is a strong negative correlation between size
and concentration. The minimum levels of concentration observed in the largest markets is
quite small (under 10%). In contrast, in the supermarket industry in 1972 (Figure 2-7), the
lowest observed level of C4 is 34.6% and there are several large markets where C4 lies in the
50-70% range. A negative correlation between size and concentration is much less apparent.
In fact, while large, highly concentrated markets are relatively common in the supermarket
industry, such outcomes are virtually non-existent in the grocery industry. Moreover, ignoring
the two most outlying points (Los Angeles and New York City), the lower bound to concen-
tration appears non-monotonic, first decreasing and then increasing.19 This effect is even more
pronounced in Figure 2-8, which shows the same relationship for supermarkets in 1998. Here,
New York City is the only outlier as concentration in Los Angeles increased sharply over this
period. This provides further evidence that the lower bound may in fact be non-monotonic.
19This non-monotonic behavior is consistent with the endogenous sunk cost model, where there may exist a
threshold level at which endogenous sunk cost competition begins. However, it cannot be explained by static
economies of scale, where a greater number of firms should "fit" into larger markets if size or advertising levels
are not strategic variables. In the supermarket industry, by 1998, New York City is the only outlier in the scatter
plot (Figure 2-8). Because New York City places strict restrictions on the size of stores, this suggests that the
lower bound to concentration may in fact be strongly non-monotonic, providing further evidence in favor of the
endogenous sunk cost model of competition.
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Figure 2-6: The lower bound to concentration (grocery industry)
In addition, in the supermarket industry, the lower bound appears to have changed very little
over 25 years, suggesting that the forces leading to high levels of local concentration are neither
recent nor transitory.
This set of results provides strong visual evidence that the non-fragmentation result ap-
plies only to the supermarket industry. While concentration reaches quite low levels in the
grocery industry, the same cannot be said for the supermarket industry. In addition, the strong
negative correlation between market size and concentration apparent in the grocery industry
is absent from the plots for the supermarket industry, where the relationship may in fact be
non-monotonic. In the following section, I formalize this analysis by estimating lower bound
functions for each industry.
2.5.2 Regression Analysis
Bounds regression analysis was introduced to economics in Sutton (1991), but it has been
utilized extensively in the statistics literature, particularly in the use of extreme value theory
for predicting climatology, pollution levels, and other "record breaking events" (Jenkinson,
1958; Gumbel, 1958; Smith, (1988, 1994)). Bounds analysis allows for the estimation of a
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"lower envelope" function for two variables based on an assumption about the distribution
from which the observed data are drawn. As such, the methodology allows for a formal test of
the hypothesis that the lower bound remains strictly positive as market size expands (C(S) > 0
as S --+ oo).
The formal process of estimating the lower bound to concentration C(S) begins with the
null hypothesis that the level of sunk costs is exogenously fixed. Under the null hypothesis,
the presence of higher levels of fixed costs (e.g. , greater advertising and store sizes in the
supermarket industry) will shift the lower bound as a function of market size, but the bound
will still approach zero as market size increases. Because the lower bound to concentration
terids to zero for all industries under the null, it is reasonable to estimate lower bounds for a
pooled set of markets from a single industry.
As suggested above, estimation depends on an assumption about the distribution function
generating the observed levels of concentration. Sutton and subsequent authors follow the
standard statistical literature (Smith, 1994) in selecting the Weibull distribution. The fact that
the Weibull distribution comes from the extreme value family makes it an attractive choice.
Because the n firm concentration ratio Cn is the sum of the largest n values in a sample of
market shares (drawn from some underlying distribution), Cn is itself an extreme value. Thus,
I proceed by modeling the distribution of residuals between the observed values and the lower
bound as a Weibull distribution. Specifically, letting xi be an observed level of concentration
and b(ze) a parametric (bound) function of market size zi, the residuals xi = yi - b(zi), are
distributed according to the distribution function:
F(x) = 1 -e( ),a> 0,s >0
Smith (1994) demonstrates the inconsistency of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
when a < 2 and suggests an alternative two-step estimation procedure which is consistent
and reasonably efficient over the entire range of a.20 This is the technique utilized in Sutton
(1991). In the first step, a functional form is chosen for b(z) and parameters are estimated
which minimize the sum of the residuals yi - b(zi), subject to the constraint that all residuals
20Smith demonstrates that the likelihood function has no local maximum for a < 1, while for 1 < a < 2, a
local maximum exists, but does not have the usual asymptotic properties of MLE.
be non-negative. The residuals from this linear programming problem are then fitted to a
Weibull distribution using MLE. The estimated Weibull distribution may then be used to
bootstrap standard errors for the parameters of the bound function by generating an empirical
distribution for each parameter.
The estimation procedure requires that the distribution of residuals be homoskedastic (iden-
tical across market sizes). Therefore, the following logit transformation of C4 to 04 is specified:21
C4 = ln(j10_C 4 )
To illustrate that the results are robust to the choice of functional form, I have chosen to
estimate both a linear and quadratic model as follows:
b
= a + Ib() + ei (Ei > 0) (Linear model) and
Ci =-a- ln•) + • i (ei > 0) (Quadratic model)
In each specification, the asymptotic level of (the transformed measure of) concentration
is captured by the intercept parameter a, while the parameters b and c determine the shape
of the lower bound. The estimated bounds are presented in Table 7 while the fitted Weibull
parameters are contained in Table 8. The asymptotic values of the estimated bounds for the
grocery industry, as S -+ 0o, are 8.5% and 7.9% for the linear and quadratic models respectively
(columns 2 and 3 of Table 7). The estimated values of C4 at the sample maximum market size
are 8.5% and 8.1%. The corresponding asymptotic values in the supermarket industry are
34.0% and 29.7%, with values of C4 at the sample maximum market size of 34.2% and 31.3%
(columns 4 and 5). The lower bound to concentration in the supermarket industry is about
four times higher than the bound in the grocery industry, suggesting that endogenous sunk
costs play a much stronger role in the supermarket industry. Since the asymptotic value of
C4 is calculated by solving a = In( C4) for C4, yielding C4 = ea, we can test the null
hypothesis that concentration in both industries converges to the same value by comparing the
difference in the estimated asymptotic values with the standard error estimated for a, leading
to a clear rejection. The estimated lower bounds are presented in Figure 2-9.
21In three markets, C4 equals 100. In these cases, the value of 100 is replaced by 99 to avoid division by zero.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 present the lower bounds estimated for the supermarket
industry using data from 1998. The results are surprisingly similar to the earlier period. The
asymptotic values of C4 are 37.5% and 35.2%, while the values of C4 at the sample maximum
market size are 39.3% and 37.3%.22 The null hypothesis that the asymptotic values in both
years are the same can be tested using the same procedure as before. Although the difference
in estimates is statistically significant, the fact that the lower bound has increased by less than
3% in 25 years suggests that the naturally oligopolistic structure of the supermarket industry is
very stable. This is somewhat surprising given the sharp decrease in the number of firms that
occurred between 1972 and 1998 (see section 2.4), the large number of new entrants that joined
the industry in recent years (e.g. Walmart), and the wave of merger activity that occurred
in the 1980s (Chevalier, 1995) and late-1990s. The estimated lower bounds are presented in
Figure 2-10.
The bounds regression results are intended to both supplement and formalize the intuition
provided by the scatter plots in section 2.5.1. However, they should be interpreted with caution.
The estimation procedure does not allow for either error in measurement or observations which
are out of equilibrium. 23 As a result, the estimation technique is very sensitive to outliers.
Although other estimation techniques are more robust to outliers (Koenker, Ng, and Portnoy,
1994), I chose to implement Smith's method because it is the method used by both Sutton and
subsequent authors, thus eliminating any inconsistency that would arise from using different
estimation methods. Using this methodology, I find strong evidence of a positive and significant
lower bound to concentration in the supermarket industry, consistent with the presence and
importance of endogenous sunk cost competition in this industry.
22The exercise was repeated excluding New York City, yielding a non-monotonic lower bound to concentration
which conformed closely to the lower envelope of the scatter of points. The quadratic term was positive and
significant. I have elected not to present these results on the grounds that outliers are in fact a significant part
of the bounds framework and should only be ignored when it is clear that their behavior is being determined
by an outside process. While the argument seems appropriate for the 1998 sample (where New York City is the
only outlier), the decision seems much less clear cut in 1972.
23The Smith procedure forces the bound function to go through points in the lower envelope.
Table 7
Lower Bound Functions
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Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8
Weibull Distribution Parameters
Industry' Grocery Stores Supermarkets Supermarkets
Year 1972 1972 1998
Model Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
a 2.19 2.20 1.98 2.01 2.26 2.15
(.12) (.12) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.09)
s 1.35 1.30 1.79 1.71 1.90 1.90
(.04) (.04) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Log-L -182.7 -171.4 -275.4 -258.8 -355.2 -378.7
Standard errors in parentheses.
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2.6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper presents empirical evidence that endogenous sunk costs play a central role in de-
termining the equilibrium structure of the supermarket industry. Using the bounds-regression
methodology on a large sample of distinct geographic markets, I document the existence of
a large, positive lower bound to the four-firm concentration ratio (C4) that asymptotes with
increasing market size to a level above 30%. Using data from 1972 and 1998, I demonstrate
that this bound has remained stable for 25 years. Through a detailed case history of the retail
food industry, I document the innovations that led to the exit of a large number of unprof-
itable firms and increased concentration, highlighting the escalation in both store size and (to a
lesser extent) advertising that differentiated the supermarket industry from the smaller grocery
industry.
This paper provides a novel test of the Sutton endogenous sunk cost framework using data
from geographically distinct retail markets. While previous tests have relied either on data from
different industries within a single country or a single industry across countries, this study takes
a different approach. Focusing on retail markets in the same industry within the same country
eliminates the need to control for technological or cultural differences, without having to rely
on a small sample of observations. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that
endogenous sunk cost investments cause industries to remain concentrated, regardless of the
size of the market. In addition, the case study evidence reveals that a steady increase in sunk
investments accompanied the rising levels of concentration that followed the introduction of the
supermarket format, providing additional support for the mechanism of competition proposed
by the endogenous sunk cost framework.
This paper also provides insight into the competitive structure of the supermarket industry,
which has been the focus of several recent studies (Chevalier, 1995; Cotterill and Haller, 1992;
Cotterill, 1999). Through a comparison with the grocery industry, I demonstrate that super-
market competition is focused on quality enhancing sunk costs resulting in much higher levels
of concentration than those found in the grocery industry. Again, the statistical evidence of
sharply differing lower bounds is supplemented with a case history detailing the developmeilt of
each industry. While there is no evidence of endogenous investment in the grocery industry, it
played a significant role in the formation of the supermarket industry, where advertising, store
size and product brandwidth increased alongside concentration.
This exercise suggests several avenues of further research. First, demonstrating that store
size and product brandwidth are the strategic variables which shape endogenous cost investment
requires looking beyond the lower bound to the interactions between individual firms. This
exercise is taken up in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Second, the emphasis on product brandwidth is
not unique to the supermarket industry, but is an important component of competition in several
retail industries such as consumer electronic stores, book stores, video rentals, and consumer
dry goods (Walmart). These firms often invest heavily in advertising as well as information
technology and advanced distribution systems. Understanding how these endogenous sunk
investments interact is the subject of future research.
Chapter 3
Vertical Product Differentiation and
Concentration in the Supermarket
Industry
3.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, several retail industries have become dominated by strong regional
or even national chains. Whether the market is video rentals, auto supplies, books, or office
supplies, these stores share several common features: a wide selection, aggressive pricing and
advertising, quick turnover, and significant investment in advanced information and distribu-
tion systems (Bendetti and Zellner, 1992; Chakravarty, 1991; Chanil, 1991; Messinger and
Narasimhan, 1995; Power and Dunkin, 1990; Saporito, 1991; Zinn and Power, 1990). Firms
such as Home Depot, Staples and Crown Books have become household names by providing
a staggering array of products at very competitive prices (Bagwell et al., 1997). While there
are clearly strong forces encouraging the formation of larger and larger chains, what is unclear
is whether these industries are tending toward local monopolies. An alternative hypothesis is
that at least some of these retail industries are tending towards "natural" oligopolies, charac-
terized by a small number of firms - but greater than one firm - competing head-to-head in
quality in local markets. Because the nature of competition is so different across these two
market structures1 (segmented monopolies versus head-to-head oligopoly), discerning the na-
ture of competition in these markets is important both for antitrust policy as well our more
general understanding of retail industries. By focusing on the supermarket industry, where
rapidly growing regional chains offer an ever expanding selection of products (Messinger and
Narasimhan, 1995) and local markets are often very concentrated (Chevalier 2; 1995), this paper
evaluates the differences between these two hypotheses and suggests a methodology for how such
an analysis might be applied to retail markets in general. The principal contributions of the
empirical work presented in this paper involve identifying the high quality set of supermarket
firms, demonstrating that they exist only in bounded numbers (do not increase proportionately
with the size of the market), and identifying features of the observed market structure which
are inconsistent with alternative explanations, namely by highlighting the distinctive nature of
strategic complementarity. Utilizing a set of complimentary empirical exercises, I demonstrate
that competition in the supermarket industry is focused on quality enhancing sunk costs, re-
sulting in a concentrated but competitive market structure that is remarkably stable across
different markets.
This paper tests for the existence of a stable oligopolistic market structure and identifies the
mechanisms sustaining it. The focus on providing a wide brandwidth of products, together with
high levels of concentration, makes vertical product differentiation (VPD) with endogenous sunk
cost investment an attractive candidate for modeling supermarket competition. In a standard
VPD model, such as Sutton (1991), firms compete for the same consumers by offering higher
quality products. When firms increase quality primarily through fixed cost investment, rivalry
between firms forces markets to converge to a natural oligopoly, where markets of varying
sizes are served by similar numbers of high quality firms (Shaked and Sutton, (1983, 1990);
1For example, suppose concentration is the result of a cost-reducing investment game (e.g. Bagwell et al.,
1997) where vigorous price competition results in the emergence of a low-cost, low-price leader. The market
leader only has an incentive to lower price as long as his competitors remain in the market. If cost differences
become large enough, the rival firms may exit, and, if the cost of re-entry is high enough, the surviving firm
may be able to charge the monopoly price indefinitely (Athey and Schmutzler, 1999). A similar argument can
be applied to the level of quality selected by the surviving monopolist. In the endogenous sunk cost framework,
high quality and low prices (below monopoly) are sustained by the presence of rival firms (and the threat of
entry).
2 Chevalier (1995) exploits the concentrated structure of the supermarket industry and the dominant role
of powerful multi-market chains to evaluate the impact of capital market imperfections on product market
competition.
Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1980). Two important features of this model are that markets need not
tend towards monopoly and, while the model accommodates the presence of a large "fringe"
of low-quality firms, it focuses attention on the nature of competition between high-quality
providers. In particular, as market size expands, rival oligarchs choose successively higher levels
of quality. Because firms must cover ever expanding sunk outlays, only a finite number of high
quality firms can "fit" into a market. As a result, the minimum efficient scale is endogenously
determined, expanding with the size of the market. Consequently, markets of very different
sizes may have very similar concentration distributions.
This model seems to accord well with the features of the supermarket industry documented
here. For example, in the supermarket industry, the top 4 firms consistently capture 65-75%
of the market. This is true for markets as small as Eugene, Oregon and as large as Los
Angeles, California. While larger markets do tend to have more firms, the increase is confined
almost exclusively to the expansion of a fringe of small firms who provide smaller, lower quality
stores. By assumption, quality (as measured by the variety of products carried or brandwidth)
is increased by incurring larger fixed costs without increasing marginal costs. Consequently,
firms who invest in higher quality are able to provide a better product (a greater brandwidth)
for the same price. As market size expands, rival firms who choose to remain in the market
must match their competitor's quality increase (or risk losing their entire market share).
Beyond simply demonstrating the existence of a natural oligarchy, the analysis also at-
tempts to characterize the nature of the strategic interaction among oligarchs, an exercise
which provides additional support for the VPD interpretation of competition. Specifically,
whereas most models of strategic investment imply strategic substitution between rival firms
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1994; Athey and Schmutzler, 1999), investment in the VPD model yields
strategic complementarity when quality enhancements expand the size of the market (by in-
ducing consumers to devote a larger fraction of their income to the quality good or by inducing
new consumers who previously consumed an outside good to join the market (Ronnen, 1991;
Lehman-Grube, 1992; Chapter 4 of this thesis)). While consistent with the VPD framework,
evidence in favor of strategic complementarity in equilibrium investment is inconsistent with
several competing models of competition, including most standard models of capacity competi-
tion, horizontal product differentiation, cost-reducing investment and product proliferation. In
particular, strategic complementarity draws a sharp distinction with models of horizontal com-
petition, in which firms maximally differentiate in order to exploit local monopoly power and
with models of cost reducing investment, where the optimal response to an opponent's invest-
ment increase is typically to reduce own investment. Much of the empirical work in this paper
focuses on demonstrating regularities in the observed structure of the supermarket industry
which distinguish between the implications of these competing models.
This paper exploits the nature of supermarket competition, namely the existence of geo-
graphically distinct markets, to provide explicit tests of the predictions of the VPD model, to
identify evidence which suggests that alternative models do not seem to be as salient, and, in so
doing, deepen our understanding of the nature of retail competition. This empirical character-
ization is achieved by exploiting a novel dataset of store level observations in 320 geographical
markets, where a market is a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Examining these markets,
I establish the existence of an oligopolistic structure that does not fragment as market size
expands. By narrowing the focus to the store level, I demonstrate that this natural oligopoly
extends all the way down to the most local levels. Unable to carve out distinct geographic
markets, the natural "oligarchs" compete head to head for the same consumers. I then use this
very local nature of competition to test one of the main predictions of the VPD framework:
a positive interaction between quality choice, market size and the equilibrium number of en-
trants. In addition, for a fixed market size, I demonstrate that quality choices are strategic
complements among supermarkets in the same local markets. Using store size (as a proxy for
brandwidth) to measure quality, I provide evidence that the presence of rival high quality firms
forces competing stores to increase their own level of quality. Since quality choices by rival
firms are endogenous variables, I account for endogeneity using instruments constructed from
the average size of rival's stores outside of the local market. The quality level of rival firms
outside the market in focus are likely to be highly correlated with the rival's choice of quality
in this market (because quality choice requires investments above the market level (e.g. adver-
tising, distribution, reputation) but are uncorrelated with specific market conditions (e.g. size
or unobserved consumer attributes) or a competitors behavior in this market. 3 As emphasized
above, the finding of strategic complementarity eliminates several competing hypotheses.
3A similar approach is used in the context of new good valuation in Hausman (1994).
Taken together, this paper makes several contributions to our emerging empirical under-
standing of sunk cost industries. First, this paper demonstrates how the VPD framework can
be applied to an industry where the two most common sources of endogenous sunk costs (adver-
tising and R&D) play only a minor role. Here, the endogeneity of investment derives from the
requirement that firms build larger stores to carry a wider array of products. Second, explicit,
cross-sectional tests of the implications of the VPD model are presented, highlighting features of
observed market structure which are inconsistent with competing hypotheses. Finally, I present
strong evidence of an oligopolistic structure which extends from the regional to the local mar-
ket and demonstrate that the main dimension of store quality acts as a strategic complement.
While competing theories may succeed in explaining a subset of the features observed in this
industry, the VPD framework accords well with the entire structure, where a small set of high
quality firms compete head to head, responding to rivals' quality increases with increases of
their own.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a context for the study through
an overview of the history and competitive structure of the supermarket industry. Section
3 provides a theoretical framework aimed at adapting the VPD model to the supermarket
industry. In particular, I identify a dimension of store quality that satisfies the assumptions
of the VPD model. The dataset is described in Section 4. In section 5, I present a first set
of empirical results aimed at determining whether competition in the supermarket industry
indeed constitutes a stable natural oligopoly. A second set of empirical results documenting the
strategic interaction between rival firms are presented in section 6. A final section offers some
concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.
3.2 The evolution and structure of the supermarket industry
In this section, I present a brief historical overview of the supermarket industry, with an em-
phasis on the innovations that contributed to its current structure. A more detailed description
of the industry's evolution is presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
From 1880 to the present, the retail food industry evolved from the general store, which
operated on a premise of low turnover and high margins, to a mixture of modern supermarkets,
operating on a premise of wide variety, high turnover and low margins and grocery stores offering
convenience (often in the form of proximity) at the expense of both price and variety (Tedlow,
1990; Lebhar, 1952; Adelman, 1958; Messinger and Narasimhan, 1995). There were two periods
of major change: 1910-1930 (the rise of the chain stores) and 1930-1960 (the introduction of
the supermarket) (Tedlow, 1990; Progressive Grocer, 1995).
The first major change in the industrial structure of the retail food industry was the chain
store revolution. The chain stores, led by the Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P),
gained a cost advantage over independent stores by integrating backward into wholesaling and
munufacturing (Adelman, 1958). Due at least in part to decreases in transportation costs, chains
were able to create a large network of stores which could take advantage of quantity discounts
on the products they didn't make themselves and economies of scale on self-produced items.
The large number of stores and intricate distribution network allowed the chains to centralize
accounting and better forecast demand, resulting in more efficient inventory management and
site selection. These cost savings were passed through to consumers in the form of lower prices.
Various price studies performed in the late 1920s and early 1930s found that chain store prices
were 4.5-14% lower than their independent counterparts (Tedlow, 1990). Concentration also
rose sharply. Between 1919 and 1932, the share of the top 5 firms in the U.S. increased from
4.2% to 28.8% (Lebhar, 1952), and the share of all chain stores increased to over 35%. However,
as demonstrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the innovations introduced by the chain stores did
not involve endogenous sunk outlays. The introduction of scale economies and tougher price
competition increased concentration at all levels, but the focus of competition never shifted
from price-cost margins to endogenous sunk outlays. Grocery stores continued to operate stores
which were physically similar to their independent counterparts (Tedlow, 1990). By the late
1920s, the price differences between chains and independents shrank as independent grocers
formed cooperative buying groups (Lebhar, 1952).
The second era of change coincided with the introduction of the supermarket format, which
heralded in a new era of endogenous sunk cost investment. These new stores, which were
located on the outskirts of town to take advantage of low rents, sold nationally advertised
goods and advertised heavily (Tedlow, 1990). In addition, a supermarket was 5 times larger
than a grocery store, carried far more products, and required customers to serve themselves.
While the chain formula may have introduced economies of scale to the food industry, the
creation of the supermarket format changed the nature of the store itself, introducing a new,
vertically differentiated product. Over time the supermarket and grocery segments became
increasingly distinct, with supermarkets becoming the primary food providers. Grocery stores
evolved into convenience stores and corner stores, capturing a much smaller portion of the
overall food market (Progressive Grocer, 1995).
The rise of the supermarket industry carried the fingerprint of the endogenous sunk cost
escalation mechanism 4 (Sutton, 1991): falling margins, escalating sunk outlays, and the appear-
ance of a lower bound to concentration bounded well above zero. 5 While the overall number of
food stores decreased from 386,900 to 126,000 from 1939 to 1997, the number of supermarkets
increased from less than 1,000 to 30,300. Across 154 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs),
the average four firm concentration ratio (C4) increased from 45.4% in 1954 to 74.8% in 1998
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1992). The increase in concentration coincided with the rise
of multi-market chains, who today account for 79% of supermarket sales. Growth was strongest
among regional and sectional chains. Local chains (operating in only a single MSA), which grew
considerably during the 1970s and 1980s, have been bought out by larger firms in the 1990s, as
larger chains continue to dominate the market (Manchester, 1992).
From 1950 to 1980, supermarkets grew mostly at the expense of the grocery segment,
steadily eroding the grocery stores' share of retail food sales. However, the share of food
sales accounted for by supermarkets leveled off at around 75% in the 1970s (Messinger and
Narasimhan, 1995). Most of the competition now occurs within the supermarket format as
opposed to across foodservice formats, with chain supermarkets (firms operating 11 or more
stores) gaining an ever increasing share of the market (Manchester, 1992). Store formats have
also changed as superstores6 and stores offering both food and drug products have begun to
4The quality escalation mechanism emphasized in Sutton (1991) refers to the process by which outcomes that
are "too fragmented" are broken as markets tend toward equilibrium. In particular, "as market size increases,
the incentives to escalate spending on fixed outlays rises. Increases in market size will be associated with a rise
in fixed outlays by at least some firms and this effect will be sufficiently strong to exclude an indefinite decline in
the level of concentration" (Sutton, 1997). This follows from the fact that the relative increase that a firm can
achieve through an increase in fixed outlays is correspondingly greater as each firm's market share is relatively
smaller.
5 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a formal empirical analysis.
6Superstores are larger versions of the conventional supermarket that provide at least 30,000 square feet of
selling area and offer more than 14,000 items. These formats often include a service deli and seafood department.
replace the conventional supermarket format. Furthermore, the firms providing these extended
formats make complementary investments in information technology (satellite communication
systems, electronic inventory control systems) which reduces the cost of stocking a large number
of products (Messinger and Narasimhan, 1995). Advertising, which helped drive the diffusion
of the supermarket format, now plays a much reduced role.7 On the other hand, the number of
products offered per store has increased from 14,145 in 1980 to 21,949 in 1994, while average
store size has increased at a rate of about 1,000 square feet per year (Progressive Grocer;
Messinger and Narasimhan, 1995).
The structure of the supermarket industry has been the focus of several recent studies.
Chevalier (1995), focusing on the impact of capital market imperfections, demonstrates that
leverage makes supermarket firms weak, encouraging tough price competition and entry by rival
firms. Cotterill and Haller (1991) look at entry by large chains. They find that supermarket
firms are more likely to enter markets which are closer to their base of operations and expe-
rienced recent growth. Entry is negatively correlated with concentration and the number of
incumbent firms, except in the case of the market leader (Albertson's), which chose to enter
more concentrated markets.8 Finally, Simpson and Hosken (1998) study the effects of mergers
on price competition. In only 1 of 3 supermarket mergers analyzed do the authors find any evi-
dence that the merger increased rival firms' performance, suggesting that supermarket mergers
are undertaken for efficiency reasons rather than collusive motives. Therefore, there is at least
suggestive evidence that, despite high levels of market concentration, competition among the
top firms in the supermarket industry is fierce.
The rise of the supermarket industry included the fierce competition and escalation in sunk
outlays predicted by the VPD model of endogenous sunk costs, which is introduced in the
following section. This focus on competing investment in quality enhancing sunk costs shows
no signs of abating with time, suggesting that tough competition among a few oligarchs is
an important feature of the structure of supermarket competition. In the following section, I
The superstore is a distinct concept from the (non-food item intensive) hypermarket and the low-margin, reduced
variety warehouse format.
7 The Advertising/Sales ratio is currently about 2%. Since 89% of advertising dollars are spent on newspapers
and circulars, it is unlikely that large chains benefit significantly from scale economies in advertising (Adweek,
1998).
8 Perhaps Albertson's was the "one smart agent" envisioned in Shaked and Sutton (1997).
outline a formal model of competition that will be empirically tested using store level data.
3., Endogenous Sunk Costs and Supermarket Competition
The observed structure of the supermarket industry requires a model of competition that com-
bines the market power and concentration of oligopoly with the competitive focus of monopo-
listic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Spence, 1976). In particular, while the supermarket
industry is dominated by a few powerful firms in each market, there is at least suggestive evi-
dence that competition is fierce among the few and focused, to at least some extent, on quality
enhancing sunk costs. In this section, I present a theoretical framework which will both guide
the empirical investigation and give an interpretation to our findings. Our initial approach
follows Sutton's bounds methodology in attempting to identify robust, testable implications
which impose only minimal constraints on the specific choice of model or form of competi-
tion. Therefore, instead of presenting a single model of supermarket competition, I present an
overview of the class of VPD models developed in Sutton (1991) and demonstrate how these
models can be used to inform our understanding of the structure of the supermarket industry.
The bounds approach creates a tension between breadth of application and the tightness of
predictions. At its most general, the theory simply places bounds on the outcomes which can be
sustained as equilibria, while imposing a finer structure yields models with closed form solutions
for unique equilibria. The purpose of this section is to create a framework for assessing the
appropriateness of VPD as a model of competition in the supermarket industry by identifying
a set of features which are consistent with the broad class of VPD models but are inconsistent
with alternative explanations. I begin with a basic model of vertical differentiation with a
homogeneous product and a representative consumer.
In the simplest model of VPD (e.g. Chapter 3 of Sutton (1991)) firms produce products
that differ only in their level of quality. Consumers are identical, with preferences defined by a
function where willingness to pay is non-decreasing in quality. Thus, if two goods of differing
quality are offered at the same price, all consumers will choose the product of higher quality.9
9This contrasts with the case of horizontal differentiation, where each product captures a positive market
share. The horizontal parameter describes tastes which are consumer specific, while the vertical parameter does
not. Specifically, consumers may differ in tastes, but they agree on quality. The vertical model of preferences is
Competition takes place in three stages: entry, quality choice and product market competition.
In the first stage, firms choose whether or not to enter the market and pay a fixed cost of entry.
In the second stage, the firms who have chosen to enter select a level of quality for the product
they will produce. Increasing the level of quality requires a second fixed cost outlay, with little
or no increase in marginal costs. The fixed costs of quality enhancement are an increasing
function of the quality level and are sunk in the period prior to product market competition.
The fixed cost function is also assumed to be sufficiently convex to rule out some multiple
equilibria that would arise in this stage.10 Product market competition in the third and final
stage is assumed to be Cournot.
Since stage 3 is Cournot, consumers choose products that maximize the quality/price ratio.
In equilibrium, the prices of goods supplied by all firms with positive market shares must be
proportionate to quality. Looking now at the second stage, the additional convexity assumption
on the fixed cost function allows calculation of the symmetric equilibrium in quality choice.
The symmetric equilibrium follows from a combination of three assumptions: 1) consumers are
identical, 2) the fixed cost function is continuous (no threshold effects), and 3) competition is
Cournot. Entry in the first stage will drive profits to zero if we ignore integer constraints on
the number of firms. In the discrete case, firms will enter until the next potential entrant would
earn negative profits, so that large profits (and margins) are sustainable in equilibrium. Finally,
since fixed costs and quality scale up with market size (because quality competition becomes
more intense), we expect roughly the same number of firms to enter, regardless of market size.11
This non-fragmentation property is the central result of the endogenous sunk cost literature.
Since only a finite number of firms will be able to cover the increased fixed costs necessary to
provide a high quality product, a finite number of firms will enter regardless of the size of the
market. 12 The equilibrium that obtains in this baseline case is referred to as a natural oligopoly
frequently characterized in the marketing literature as having an "infinite ideal point".
1oThe exact condition is derived in Sutton (1991), p. 53.
"This argument depends on the assumption that marginal costs increase only slightly with higher levels of
quality, allowing firms to shift the focus of competition onto fixed outlays. If quality were provided through
increases in marginal costs, the fragmented Hotelling result would obtain in the vertical case as well, with firms
stratifying along the quality dimension and serving distinct consumer groups, segmented by income bands (Tirole,
1988).
12This example may be extended to allow for Bertrand competition in the third stage (Shaked and Sutton,
1983; Ronnen, 1991) or sequential entry (Sutton, 1991; Lehmann-Grube, 1997). The natural oligopoly result
will continue to hold with similar assumptions. However, the equilibrium will no longer be symmetric: firms
(Shaked and Sutton (1983)).
In the context of the supermarket industry, a natural candidate for a purely vertical mea-
sure of quality is brandwidth, or the number of products carried by the store. A wide choice
set appeals to all consumers and allows supermarkets to draw from a broader customer base.
Furthermore, to efficiently expand brandwidth firms must make a joint investment in fixed costs
at the store and the firm level. On the one hand, firms invest in industry specific information
technology and distribution systems to efficiently stock a wider array of products (Messinger
and Narasimhan, 1995). However, firms must also build larger stores to carry their products. 13
Because of their unique, single-floor, space-intensive design, supermarkets are not easily con-
verted into other uses. 14 Therefore, increasing brandwidth requires outlays which are both fixed
and sunk. Furthermore, since the cost of land increases in consumer density, store level sunk
costs may actually increase with the size of the market. 15
Clearly there are several other dimensions of quality along which supermarkets compete,
such as offering deli bars, fresh produce, and shorter check-out lines. In practice, the stores of-
fering the widest selection tend to invest in other quality enhancements as well.16 Furthermore,
cost reducing investments create complementarities across several forms of quality. Nonetheless,
our empirical analysis focuses on brandwidth as the single measure of store quality.
In the homogeneous vertically differentiated product case, there is a unique equilibrium
number of entrants corresponding to each market size (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1980; Shaked
and Sutton, 1983). Furthermore, the equilibrium number of entrants is finite, regardless of
the size of the market. The limiting number of entrants depends on the convexity of the cost
function (Sutton, 1996). Depending on the parameters of the model, the number of firms may
either approach this finite limit from above or below as market size increases. In the case where
offer a staggered set of qualities, but only a finite number of qualities (products) are introduced, yielding a finite
number of entrants. If competition were Bertrand but consumers were identical, only one firm would enter in
equilibrium.
13Surveys consistently indicate that consumers place a high value on wide aisles and easily accessible products
(Progressive Grocer). It is not sufficient to simply cram a wider selection into smaller, existing stores.
14The owners of a supermarket chain that recently chose to close down and sell off their assets claimed that
the most recently built stores were the most difficult to unload (personal communication with author).
151If sunk costs increase with the size of the market, maintaining a fixed level of quality is more expensive in
larger markets. In this case, the larger number of consumers over which to spread sunk costs is offset by the
rising level of sunk costs, providing an alternative mechanism through which sunk costs may be endogenized.
16The exception of course being ultra high quality specialty stores such as Gelson's Markets or Whole Foods
Markets.
fixed costs are a function of quality alone (not the size of the market), the level of quality
increases monotonically with the size of the market. (See the baseline model of Chapter 4 of
this thesis for a specific analytical example.)
When the model is extended to include horizontal differentiation, the results are more
complicated (Shaked and Sutton, (1987, 1990)). To understand how the addition of a horizontal
dimension impacts the outcome, it is informative to begin by considering the purely horizontal
case, in which firms enter simultaneously and produce a single, distinct product that does not
have a vertical attribute. Marginal costs are assumed to be constant. In this case, the number
of firms increases proportionately with the size of the market, causing concentration to decrease
indefinitely (Sutton, 1991). Intuitively, the number of firms which fit into a market depends
only on the relationship between fixed cost and market size. As market size increases, fixed
costs fall relative to the size of the market, increasing the equilibrium number of firms that may
profitably enter.
This simple result is complicated when firms enter sequentially or own multiple stores
(Shaked and Sutton, 1990; Sutton, 1991). There may no longer be a unique equilibrium. There-
fore, the relationship between market size and the equilibrium number of firms is no longer a
unique mapping. However, it is still feasible to demonstrate that, in the horizontal case, the
maximal number of equilibrium entrants corresponding to a given market size increases without
bound as market size expands (Shaked and Sutton, 1990; Sutton, 1991). Therefore, given a
large sample of markets, we should observe some outcomes in which the market fragments.
When the horizontal and vertical cases are combined (as in Sutton (1991) pp. 65-66), a dual
structure may emerge in which firms belong to one of two tiers. In the simplest, symmetric
example, the top tier of firms compete in sunk outlays and provide high quality. Only a finite
number of these firms will enter, regardless of the size of the market. The second tier of firms
provides the minimum quality level, investing only in the (exogenous) sunk cost of entry.17
The number of these firms increases indefinitely with the size of the market. Clearly, the total
number of firms in the industry will increase without bound as well.
Because of the indeterminacy associated with multiple equilibria and the aggregate nature
17The two-tiered industry structure is also analyzed in Lancaster (1996), although the focus there is not on
endogenous versus exogenous sunk costs.
of most data on industry structure, tests of the endogenous sunk cost framework have tended
to focus on the non-fragmentation property of these models. The non-fragmentation property
states that when sunk costs are endogenously determined, the maximal market share of the
largest firm is bounded above zero, independent of the size of the market. This property can
be tested by estimating the lower bound to observed levels of (some measure of) concentration
(Sutton, 1991; Robinson and Chiang, 1996; Chapter 2 of this thesis). However, given sufficiently
disaggregated data and some additional assumptions, it is possible to evaluate some of the
theory's more restrictive predictions. In particular, if it is feasible to identify the firms making
investments in high quality, there is a direct test of whether these firms exist only in bounded
numbers. Furthermore, by looking at the geographic locations of firms, we can observe whether
firms indeed compete head to head for the same consumers as the theory implies. The challenge
of the empirical work presented in this paper is to identify the high quality set of supermarket
firms, demonstrate that they exist only in bounded numbers (do not increase proportionately
with the size of the market), and to identify features of the observed market structure which
are inconsistent with alternative explanations, namely by highlighting the distinctive nature
of strategic complementarity. To facilitate the latter exercise, we will first need to deepen our
understanding of the strategic nature of quality competition.
3.3.1 Vertical Product Differentiation and Strategic Complementarity
How firms react to investments by rival firms provides direct insight into the mechanisms
that shape competition. In particular, if a firm responds to a rival's quality increase with an
increase of its own, it is unlikely that the investment was cost reducing in nature, since the
optimal response in that case is typically to reduce own investment (Athey and Schmutzler,
1999). This is also the case when the investment takes the form of a capacity increase (Dixit,
(1979, 1980); Spence, (1977, 1979)). As such, a finding of complementarity in investment
greatly narrows the scope of candidate models. In chapter 4 of this thesis, I demonstrate that
the VPD framework is consistent with either strategic substitution or complementarity in the
level of quality. Which result obtains depends critically on the manner in which quality enters
the indirect utility function. In the baseline model of Sutton (1991), quality enters through
the ratio of quality to price, meaning that consumers care only about quality per dollar or
efficiency units. This (log) linear relationship between quality and price is common to several
models of quality differentiation. Chapter 4 demonstrates that, in this baseline model, quality
choices are always (local) strategic substitutes. This result follows from the fact that increases
in quality do not induce consumers to spend a higher fraction of their income on the quality
good. Therefore, if a single firm raises its quality (and price), it will need to capture a larger
share of the market to cover the increased fixed costs of providing a higher quality. Since the
level of demand is fixed, the optimal reaction of his competitor is to reduce quality (and price).
This intuition is much more general and applies across a wide class of models of cost re-
ducing investment (Bagwell and Staiger, 1994; Athey and Schmutzler, 1999). In chapter 4, I
demonstrate that, since consumers care only about efficiency units, the baseline model can be
reformulated as a model of cost reducing investment where quality does not enter the utility
function at all. Thus, reinterpreted as a model of cost reducing investment, it is not surprising
that Sutton's baseline model yields strategic substitution. Furthermore, his emphasis on qual-
ity competition seems misplaced. Instead, the natural oligopoly result follows more directly
from the fact that "rivalry is both tough and focused on fixed outlays" (Schmalensee, 1992),
irrespective of the particular output of those outlays. Moreover, Sutton's (1991) focus on the
quality escalation mechanism is misleading. While it is true that in movements from disequilib-
rium to equilibrium18 , firms will increase quality together, it is clearly not the case that, within
equilibrium, firms will respond in kind to increases in quality by rival firms.
However, when the relationship between quality and price is non-linear, increases in quality
can induce consumers to spend a higher fraction of their income on the quality good, shifting
the strategic interaction between firms to strategic complementarity. In chapter 4, I present an
alternative specification of the baseline model where quality choices are strategic complements
around the equilibrium. The set-up is identical to Sutton (1991), only quality and price no longer
enter as a ratio. Instead, a non-linear specification allows consumers to value the overall level
of quality opposed to simply efficiency units.19 As a result, in equilibrium, increases in quality
induce consumers to devote a larger fraction of income to the quality good (by substituting out
18For example, if market size expanded or the underlying technological structure of an industry changed,
markets would, at least temporarily, be out of equilibrium.
191In the context of supermarket competition, consumers might be willing to pay more for all goods when they
are offered a broader selection.
of an outside good). 20 Consequently, firms are no longer splitting a "fixed pie", consumption
and the level of quality are endogenously determined. The effect on strategic interaction is a
shift to strategic complementarity: firms react in kind to increases in quality by their rivals.
The complementarity result is not confined to the example presented in Chapter 4 of this
thesis. Analogous findings are presented in Ronnen (1991) and Lehmann-Grube (1997). In
Ronnen's example, which is based on Shaked and Sutton (1983), consumers' incomes are allowed
to vary and competition is Bertrand. In the resulting equilibrium, firms offer a staggered set of
qualities. In the two firm case, when the high quality firm raises quality, the low quality firm
follows suit and vice versa. The result follows from the fact that the market is not fully covered
in equilibrium so that changes in quality induce consumers who previously consumed the outside
good to join the market. Again, quality enhancements effectively increase the available "pie".
Lehmann-Grube presents similar results to Ronnen in a model with sequential entry.
This set of results indicate that strategic complementarity is consistent with several models
of VPD, suggesting a potentially powerful to distinguish VPD from alternative mechanisms
of competition. In the following section, I highlight several competing explanations for the
observed structure of the supermarket industry. In many cases, strategic substitution is an
empirical implication. Where it is not, I will indicate additional implications which can be
evaluated using the data at hand.
3.3.2 Alternative Explanations for Concentrated Market Structure
Our discussion of the VPD framework was motivated by the high levels of concentration in the
supermarket industry across geographic markets of varying size. Of course, there exist a variety
of alternative explanations for the observed data (such as sequential entry, horizontal product
differentiation, or complementarities in cost reducing investment) and, without further analysis,
we cannot distinguish among these alternatives. Therefore, the remainder of this section briefly
reviews some principal alternative explanations and identifies potential empirical implications
to distinguish between VPD and each of these alternative theories.
In particular, I will demonstrate how standard models of product proliferation or capacity
competition can be rejected by the data. Finally, I will consider two alternative forms of
20The fraction of income devoted to the quality good is constant in the baseline Sutton (1991) model.
endogenous sunk cost investment, quality enhancement and cost reduction, and demonstrate
how the strategic choices of firms can be used to distinguish between models of endogenous
cost.
Our first task is simply to re-emphasize the central theme of the section 3.3: exogenous
sunk costs alone cannot lead to non-fragmentation. Specifically, even if large chains are able to
take advantage of economies of scale in the form of quantity discounts and more efficient dis-
tribution, so long as these economies are exogenously determined, fragmentation will continue
to occur at some level (Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 1991). Assuming that the economies
are regional or even national in scale, we should observe several local and even regional mo-
nopolies. Small markets should consistently be served by a single firm. Observing the same
number of firms serving markets of vastly differing sizes is simply not consistent with a static
model of scale. Only when sunk costs are endogenously determined will we observe a positive
lower bound to concentration. Therefore, evidence of non-fragmentation alone is sufficient to
discredit the exogenous scale hypothesis.21 However, the nature of competition can be altered
to produce higher equilibrium levels of concentration while preserving the exogenous nature of
sunk investments.
A natural class of alternative models to consider are horizontal product differentiation
(HPD) models of sequential entry. While Shaked and Sutton (1987) demonstrate that HPD with
simultaneous entry will not yield non-fragmentation, 22 models where firms enter sequentially
are consistent with persistently high levels of concentration. Shaked and Sutton (1990) demon-
strates that the fragmentation result continues to hold when entry is sequential. However, the
non-fragmentation result is not the only empirical implication which can distinguish the HPD
mechanism from VPD. Consider a standard product proliferation model with sequential entry,
21The static scale economies story is more consistent with the chain store era of grocery store competition,
when large chain stores were vertically integrated into production (manufacturing). The market share of A&P,
one of the first truly national grocery chains, rose and fell on the merits of its private label brands. A&P
established a large market share in the 1920s by offering much lower prices on their own brands. However, the
introduction of the supermarket format and the concomitant rise of national brands has all but wiped A&P out
of existence (they no longer depend on own brand sales). Some supermarket chains continue to offer private
label products in addition to national brands. Their popularity grew in the 1970s but has since waned. Since
private labels are much more common in Europe, a cross national comparison of markets would be enlightening.
22In the standard circle model (Salop ,1979), for example, although there is no formal measure of market
size, the number of entrants increases monotonically with the ratio of transportation costs to fixed costs. Since
transportation costs are increasing in distance, it is clear that the number of entrants increases proportionately
with the "size" of the market.
such as Schmalensee (1978), where a small group of firms, acting as a cartel, try to pack the
product space by filling all available niches and thereby, soften price competition among their
products. In equilibrium, competition is localized, with single firms (or the cartel) producing
all the products along a continuous segment of the product space. Bonano (1987) extends
this analysis to include strategic location choice by a monopolist. Further persistence of local
monopoly results are established by Prescott and Visscher (1977), Eaton and Lipsey (1979)
and Reynolds (1987). In each of these models, competition is localized (Schmalensee, 1985)
meaning that firms enjoy a monopoly over continuous regions of the product space. As such,
a finding of head to head competition, where firms compete directly for the same consumers,
is inconsistent with most standard models of HPD with concentrated equilibria. 23 Moreover,
Tirole (1989) demonstrates that in HPD models of competition on the line where firms are able
to choose their unit costs by investing in sunk outlays, the fixed investments behave as strategic
substitutes.
Another class of models consistent with highly concentrated equilibria are models of en-
try deterring capacity investment. In fact, the measure of quality proposed in this paper -
brandwidth - could easily be interpreted as a capacity choice, especially when brandwidth is
measured by store size. In a standard Stackelberg (1934) model of capacity choice (Spence
(1977, 1979); Dixit (1979, 1980)), large firms invest in excess capacity to deter entry, resulting
in highly concentrated equilibria. However, in all of these models, capacity choices behave as
strategic substitutes. While Bulow et al. (1985a) construct a model where capacity choices are
complements, the complementarity result relies on extreme convexity of the demand function.
Moreover, the complementarity result applies only to the Stackelberg leader; for the Stackelberg
follower, capacity choice remains a strategic substitute. As such, a finding of strategic com-
plementarity is again sufficient to rule out most Stackelberg games of capacity competition.24
By estimating the reaction curves 25 of rival firms, we should be able to distinguish capacity
competition from the endogenous sunk cost VPD framework.
23An exception is Eaton and Lipsey (1982), where firms cluster around certain "poles", such as shopping
districts and shopping malls.
24 Obviously, when capacity choice is simultaneous, competition is Cournot and reaction functions are downward
sloping (Bulow et al, 1985b).
25 Note that in this exercise the reaction curves are between capacity choices in the Cournot capacity model
and quality choices in the endogenous sunk cost model. Of course, both concepts are measured by the same
brandwidth (store size) parameter.
A growing literature, extending the capacity choice/entry deterrence framework, is aimed
at explaining the high degree of concentration in retail markets using models of cost reducing
investment (Bagwell and Ramey, 1994; Bagwell et al., 1997). In these models, vigorous price
competition leads to the emergence of a dominant low-cost, low-price leader. 26 Although these
investments in cost reduction are not endogenous, they are clearly strategic and consistent with
a very high degree of concentration (monopoly, in fact, in the limit). Cost reducing investments
can be endogenous investments as well. In chapter 4 of this thesis, I demonstrate that the
Sutton (1991) baseline model can be reformulated as a model of cost reduction, indicating that
cost reducing investments are consistent with both monopoly (Bagwell et al., 1997) and natural
oligopoly (Sutton, 1991) outcomes. However, in both models, investment in cost reduction
is a strategic substitute among rival firms. In fact, the substitution result holds across most
standard models of cost reducing investment. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) demonstrate that
investments in cost-reducing or quality enhancing R&D are strategic substitutes under fairly
general conditions (satisfied by both Bagwell and Ramey, 1994 and Bagwell et al., 1997). I
demonstrate that strategic substitution obtains in the baseline Sutton (1991) model in chapter
4 of this thesis. Athey and Schmutzler (1999) extend Bagwell and Staiger's results to include
several additional classes of models, including Bertrand or Cournot competition with differen-
tiated goods, constant marginal costs and linear demand (e.g. Dixit, 1979), HPD on the line
(d'Aspremont et al., 1979) or the circle (Salop, 1979) with quadratic transportation costs, and
the VPD model of Shaked and Sutton (1983). Indeed, it seems that only when investments
are quality enhancing, as in the brandwidth model of chapter 4, are investments complements.
Specifically, it is only when quality enhancing investments induce consumers to substitute out
of an outside good and devote a larger share of income to the quality good, that VPD models
lead to complementarity in quality.27 Therefore, although strategic complementarity in invest-
ment may not rule out every conceivable model of cost reduction, it is inconsistent at least with
26The emergence of a monopolist who, if re-entry is costly, can charge the monopoly price once his rivals have
exited, suggests that welfare may be lower in this case than in the case where oligopolists must continue to
compete for customers.
2 7 There are, in fact, three distinct versions of this result: Ronnen (1991), Lehmann-Grube (1997) and chapter
4 of this thesis. The first two examples utilize Bertrand competition and characterize asymmetric equilibria in
quality. Consumers are restricted to consuming at most one unit of the quality good. In the examples presented
in chapter 4 of this thesis, competition is Cournot, consumers are allowed to consume any quantity of the quality
good, and symmetric equilibria in quality are characterized.
the standard models, allowing broad classes of models to be eliminated from consideration. 28
Moreover, estimating reaction functions provides an empirical method of not only distinguishing
models where investments result in monopoly, but distinguishing between competing models of
endogenous investment as well.
The collection of alternative models and empirical implications discussed here (the main
results are summarized in Table 1) illustrate how the empirical methods utilized in this paper
cannot rely on a single result to prove that VPD is the most appropriate model of competition in
the supermarket industry. Rather, I will present a combination of results which, taken together,
correspond closely to the predictions of the VPD framework, but contradict central implications
of the alternative hypotheses discussed here. After providing an overview of the data in the
following section, I will proceed to the central empirical exercises of this paper.
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3.4 Data
Documenting the competitive structure of an industry requires very detailed data that can be
disaggregated down to the store level. In particular, for each supermarket in every market,
28Those familiar with the literature on patent races know that strategic complementarity is fairly common in
models of R&D and innovation. However, the complementarity result does seem to depend on the "winner take
all" aspect specific to patent races (Reinganum, 1989).
we need to observe the ultimate owner or parent company, a measure of sales volume, several
measures of quality (e.g. size, features), and its exact location. The data come from Trade
Dimension's Retail Tenant Database. Trade Dimensions collects store level data on nearly
every supermarket in operation in the U.S. for use in their Marketing Guidebook and Market
Scope publications, as well as selected issues of Progressive Grocer magazine. The data is
also sold to marketing firms and food manufacturers for use in the marketing of supermarket
products. The definition of a supermarket used by Trade Dimensions is the industry standard: a
foodstore with greater than $2 million in yearly revenues. Note that this is an establishment level
definition. In 1998, there were 30,557 supermarkets in the U.S., 21,225 operating in counties
within a designated MSA. Individual stores are identified by street address, zip code and county
code. Each store is assigned a unique identifying code that remains with the location, even if
ownership changes. Thus, newly built stores can be distinguished from remodels or buyouts.
For each store in the database, its place in the organizational hierarchy is clearly documented,
indicating the operating name, ultimate parent company, the number of stores in the chain and
the principal supplier. The degree of vertical integration is therefore completely observable.
Stores are already grouped according to several market definitions (zip code through MSA) and
additional groupings are straightforward.
At the store level, Trade Dimensions collects information on average weekly volume, store
size, number of checkouts, number of full and part time employees, whether scanners are in
operation, and the presence or absence of various service counters (e.g. deli, seafood) as well as
other measures of quality (atm, check cashing). This information is gathered through quarterly
surveys sent to store managers and checked against similar surveys given to the principal food
broker associated with that store. Demographic variables were collected from census projections
for 1997 at the MSA, county and zip code levels. When different aggregations were needed (e.g.
4 digit zip code demographics), population weighted averages were used. Summary statistics
are contained in Table 2.
From Table 2, it is clear that the average supermarket operates far above the $2 million
cutoff. In fact, the largest supermarkets have revenues over $1 million per week. The average
supermarket has a selling area of 30,700 square feet. The newest stores offer between 60,000 and
80,000 square feet of selling area (Progressive Grocer). The relatively small average size reflects
the fact that many stores have been in place for 10 to 20 years. Only 54% of supermarkets
supply themselves (vertically integrate into distribution), while the remaining stores contract
with an independent supplier. 28% of supermarkets are owned by firms that operate in only one
MSA. Most of these firms are independent (in fact, single store) firms. Finally, while scanning
registers have diffused into the vast majority of supermarkets, other features such as ATM
machines and service bakeries are less common.
Table 2
Variables
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Volume
Size
Checkouts
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Weekly Sales Volume
Square Feet of Selling Area
Number of checkouts
Vertical Integration Indicator
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National chain indicator
Scanner indicator
Service deli indicator
Service bakery indicator
ATM machine indicator
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Mean
251432.2
30.7
9.5
0.54
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0.25
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0.55
21255
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166042.4
17.0
5.5
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0.45
0.45
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3.5 Evidence of Oligopoly in Supermarkets
The empirical analysis proceeds in four stages, the overall goal of which is to provide a body of
evidence in favor of the quality enhancing VPD explanation of concentration in the supermarket
industry, while providing several pieces of evidence to reject some of the key alternative hy-
potheses discussed in section 3.3. First, the existence of a positive lower bound to concentration
is established - in most markets, 3-5 firms capture a 60-80% market share. This key finding is
robust to the level of aggregation or the region analyzed; in large markets, the number of fringe
firms expands, but the number and realized share of the oligarchs remains stable. Second, a
"quality wedge" between oligarchs and fringe firms is identified; oligarchs offer approximately
double the "brandwidth" of the fringe firms and are much more likely to provide additional
quality enhancements such as bakeries, service counters and in-store ATM machines. The fo-
cus then shifts to demonstrating that oligarchs compete head-to-head, at least geographically.
In particular, I am able to demonstrate that at numerous levels of aggregation, there is little
geographic segmentation. Finally, in section 3.6, I refine the analysis to focus on the nature
of strategic interaction, demonstrating that the quality choices of rival firms are strategic com-
plements. This finding allows us to rule out several competing hypotheses, including several
models of cost reducing investment. The challenge of the empirical work presented here is to
document the existence of a set of high quality firms which a) exist only in bounded numbers
and b) compete head to head for the same consumers. In addition, I will identify features of
the market structure which are inconsistent with competing theories. The first set of results
illustrates how concentration remains strictly positive, regardless of the size of the market.
3.5.1 The Lower Bound to Concentration
Our first set of results highlight the central non-fragmentation result presented in Chapter
2: equilibrium concentration remains strictly positive as market size increases. Figure 3-1
illustrates the relationship between concentration and market size using the share of the largest
firm (C1) to measure concentration. 29 Here, a market is taken to be an MSA, the definition
used both by supermarket firms and in previous studies of the industry.30 I measure the size
of a market using the log of its population. There are 320 distinct markets in the sample. New
York City was dropped from the sample because zoning laws place severe restrictions on the size
of supermarkets in Manhattan. 31 The non-fragmentation result is immediate upon inspection.
2 9 See chapter 2 of this thesis for a formal empirical analysis using an alternative measure of concentration
(04).30 This definition has been widely used in previous studies of the supermarket industry (Chevalier (1995, 1996);
Cotterili and Haller, 1992), in trade journals, and by the Federal Trade Commission in assessing merger activity.
Its choice is justified on theoretical grounds by the fact that supermarket chains operate divisions and distribution
centers at the MSA level, distribute advertising circulars at the MSA level, and consider their competitors to be
firms operating in the same MSA (Baer, 1999; Chevalier, 1995).
31New York City was included in the analysis in Chapter 2 of this thesis. This is because a) it was not the
only outlier in the earlier period (1972) and b) outliers play a central role in bounds analysis. Moreover, the
non-fragmentation result continues to hold when New York City is included. However, because New York City
There is a clear lower bound to concentration which remains strictly positive as market size
expands. Indeed, the lower bound reaches a minimum quite quickly and then actually increases
with market size. This convex, bounded relationship suggests that while scale economies may
play an important role, they are not the main determinant of market structure. With pure scale
economies, concentration would tend to zero as the market expands. Only when sunk costs (and
minimum efficient scale) are determined endogenously, can we expect to see markets remain
concentrated indefinitely. The fact that the lower bound first falls and then increases can be
explained with a model of endogenous sunk costs where investment only impacts willingness-
to-pay beyond a certain threshold level (of investment). 32 However, this non-convex behavior
cannot be explained by simple (static) scale economies, where a larger number of firms fit into
larger markets.
The share of the second largest firm (Figure 3-2) is also bounded below, indicating that even
the smallest markets do not converge to monopoly. Although the share of the market served
by the second through fourth firms decreases substantially, it does not decrease to zero (the
fourth firm serves on average 9% of a market). Moreover, in several instances the fourth largest
firm in a market is the market leader somewhere else. These findings of non-fragmentation
can be viewed as the first piece of evidence that supermarket competition must, at some level,
be focused on sunk outlays. However, demonstrating that VPD is in fact the mechanism of
competition requires identifying a natural oligopoly of high quality firms competing side by
side. This can only be accomplished by looking above the bound.
3.5.2 Identifying an Oligarchy
In this section, I demonstrate that, in markets of differing sizes, roughly the same number
of firms capture 70-80% of the market. This result is robust to the level of aggregation or
definition of market. In the following sections, I demonstrate that a) these firms provide a
distinct, higher quality product than the remaining fringe of firms and b) they compete head
to head for the same consumers. However, in order to justify proceeding to these more detailed
is the only outlier in 1998 and a reasonable case can be made that the forces determining its observed level of
concentration are outside the endogenous sunk cost framework (i.e. government regulation), I chose to exclude
New York City from the current analysis.
32 For example, advertising might only be effective beyond some minimal level or there might be minimum
purchase requirements for television commercials (Sutton, 1991).
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results, it is first necessary to establish the existence of an oligarchy. Our second set of empirical
results addresses this question by focusing on individual firms, establishing that roughly the
same number of high quality firms enter a market, irrespective of its size. Figures 3-3 and 3-4
present Lorenz curves for two west coast markets (MSAs), Eugene Oregon and Los Angeles
California. In this exercise, the horizontal axis measures the rank of the firm (from largest to
smallest) in terms of sales while the vertical axis measures cumulative sales as a share of the
total. Although the markets vary greatly in size, the larger market differs from the smaller one
almost exclusively in the length of the tail of small firms. 33 Figure 3-5 presents Lorenz curves for
MSAs in several west coast markets. The uniformity in outcomes across markets is striking. For
a wide class of markets, 65-70% of the market is controlled by 4 or 5 firms, with the remainder
of the market being served by a fringe of firms that expands with population. Figures 5-1 to
5-8 in the appendix extend this analysis to include every MSA in the sample. There are a few
outliers (e.g. Minneapolis in the northwest, Oklahoma City in the southwest, Kansas City in
the Ohio Valley, and New York in the Northeast), but the uniformity of outcomes remains.
Again, these configurations are not consistent with an exogenous scale economy story, as there
does not appear to be any tendency towards a single dominant firm. Among the 320 MSAs,
only 36 have a single firm capturing over 50 percent of the market. Of these 36 markets, 12 have
a single firm capturing between 60 and 70 percent and 2 have a single firm capturing between
70 and 85 percent. If concentration were being driven purely by exogenous economies of scale,
we would expect to consistently observe one firm, especially in the smaller markets. The fact
that we observe so few single-firm dominated markets even in the smallest markets, suggests
that natural oligopoly is a stable outcome and that some additional force is driving industry
structure.
The level of concentration clearly depends on market definition. While the MSA is widely
considered to be the level at which large supermarket chains compete (both advertising and
distribution take place at the MSA level), it is possible that these results could depend crit-
ically on the level of aggregation. I find that they do not. Table 3 presents average market
concentration (04) for several market definitions, broken down by region. While concentration
33 This analysis includes only firms which operate more than one store. The inclusion of single store firms
merely increases the length of the tail of firms in large markets, but scale problems make the graphs difficult to
compare.
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Figure 3-5: Cumulative market share (West Coast MSAs)
decreases significantly at the regional level, the state and MSA levels are quite similar. These
results also indicate that while regional variation exists, it is not consistent across markets. For
example, although the older markets appear less concentrated at the state and regional level,
the effect is much less pronounced at the MSA level. Figures 3-6 and 3-7 demonstrate that
the oligopolistic structure extends up to the state and regional levels respectively (the sample
remains west coast markets for ease of comparison). At each level of aggregation, the top 4
firms in the market capture most of the total sales.
Taken together, these results suggest that supermarket competition indeed takes the form
of natural oligopoly. In fact, although the oligopolistic structure extends up several levels of
aggregation, MSAs are still served by 4-5 high quality firms. While economies of scale clearly
play an important role and endogenous sunk costs may efficiently be sunk above the MSA level,
firms still face direct competition in every market. In the following sections, I demonstrate how
this result extends all the way down to the individual store.
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Figure 3-6: Cumulative market share (State level)
Table 3
Concentration by Market
Area MSA State Region National
West .73 .68 .61 .24
Northwest .88 .78 .46 .24
Southwest .79 .71 .55 .24
South .82 .63 .45 .24
Ohio Valley .75 .58 .46 .24
Great Lakes .74 .51 .33 .24
Northeast .76 .68 .30 .24
South Atlantic .81 .69 .56 .24
3.5.3 Top Firms Provide a Distinct Product
The preceding exercises established not only that concentration remains positive at all market
sizes, but that the top 4 firms capture 70-80% of a market's sales, regardless of the size of the
market. In this subsection, I extend this analysis by demonstrating that the product provided
by top 4 firms is significantly different from that of the fringe. In particular, the quality level
of the top firms (as measured by store size and the number of store features) is almost twice as
high as the level chosen by firms in the fringe. Establishing that the oligarchs provide a distinct
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product justifies focusing on competition among firms in this set alone. In the following section,
I demonstrate that this set of oligarchs compete side by side in local markets and do not carve
out local (geographic) monopolies. This finding of competition at the local level reflects the
rivalry emphasized in the VPD framework and casts doubt on the validity of alternative non-
competitive explantations (e.g. product proliferation) which predict substantial balkanization
of competition.
Although the optimal measure of quality suggested by the VPD model would combine a
measure of brandwidth with store size,34 Trade Dimensions does not collect information on the
number of products offered by each store. Therefore, I will use store size alone to proxy for
quality. As a robustness check, I present two alternative measures of quality constructed from
store characteristics: the number of features present in a store (0-2 among an in-store bakery
and deli) and a similar measure for scanners and atm machines (technology).
Table 4 investigates the relationship between store quality and firm type. For the entire
sample of 320 MSAs, firms are divided into the top 4 firms in each MSA and the remaining
fringe of firms (firms which operate in more than one MSA are treated as separate observations).
The average store level characteristics are calculated for each class of firm across all MSAs. The
top 4 firms offer significantly higher levels of quality along all three dimensions. In addition,
34 Providing a large brandwidth requires stocking a wide array of products and building a larger stores. Wide
aisles and easily accessible products consistently rate highly in consumer surveys (Progressive Grocer). Therefore,
even the number of stock keeping units (SKUs) offered in each store would not fully capture this measure of
quality.
top 4 firms are more than twice as likely to be vertically integrated and operate over three
times as many stores. 35 The last two columns of Table 4 address the hypothesis that sunk cost
outlays may be optimally sunk above the firm level. Stores are divided according to whether
their parent company operates stores in one or more than one market. The results are broadly
similar to the results from the top4/fringe division: multi-market firms choose higher levels of
quality and are considerably more likely to be vertically integrated.
Table 4
Store Characteristics by Firm Type
Firm Type
Characteristic Top 4 Fringe Multi-market Single-market
Size 40.4 24.1 33.5 20.0
(16.0) (15.2) (17.0) (15.0)
Technology 1.58 1.21 1.40 1.21
(.42) (.62) (.58) (.49)
Features 1.75 1.31 1.54 1.34
(.42) (.74) (.68) (.56)
% VI 0.68 0.31 0.57 0.01
(.46) (.46) (.49) (.10)
Stores 487.6 131.7 344.4 2.84
(469.9) (261.4) (422.7) (3.34)
Observations 1257 1735 2439 553
Table 5 uses regression analysis to test the significance of the quality "wedge" for the top 4
firms. Using the sample of firm-MSA level observations, each measure of average store quality
is regressed on a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is in the top 4 in this MSA and a
full set of MSA fixed effects. Quality is measured in levels, with average store size measured in
1000s. All three measures of quality are significantly higher among the top 4 firms. These results
suggest that membership in the "oligarchy" entails providing a significantly different product
than the fringe firms. If scale economies and quantity discounts alone were determining market
structure, we would not expect the store characteristics of lead firms to differ from the followers.
35The number of stores operated is the total number of stores operated by a firm across all MSAs.
We would simply expect the market leaders to have lower prices.36
As such, this set of findings justifies shifting our focus to competition among the oligarchs,
treating the fringe as a separate industry,37 which does not significantly impact competition
among the oligarchs. To summarize, the preceding empirical results identified a high quality
set of supermarkets that exits only in bounded numbers, regardless of the size of the market.
The goal of the next set of results is to demonstrate that these firms in fact compete side by
side for the same consumers, consistent with the rivalry emphasized in the VPD framework.
Table 5
Store Characteristic Regressions
Dependent Variable
Size Technology Features
Top 4 Dummy 17.4 .39 .44
(.61) (.02) (.02)
Constant 23.6 1.32 1.32
(.38) (.01) (.02)
MSA Fixed Effect Included
R2  .32 .23 .23
Observations 2992
Standard errors in parentheses.
3.5.4 The Structure of Local Competition
The empirical exercises in the previous subsections establish that markets of varying sizes are
served by roughly the same number of high quality firms. However, several forms of local
competition are consistent with this structure. For example, in equilibrium, firms might serve
distinct geographic regions (as in product proliferation models). Consumers would therefore face
36This was precisely the case when A&P dominated the grocery industry (Tedlow, 1990).
37This raises the question of what market is actually being served by the fringe firms. Cotterill (1986) finds
that prices are 2.6% higher among independent supermarkets in the Vermont area, suggesting that independent
firms may charge a premium for location or convenience. In addition, he finds a non-linear relationship between
price and store size, suggesting that the largest stores are able to charge a premium for quality (size). These
findings support the claim that independent supermarkets and premium chains serve distinct markets.
local monopolies in each submarket. On the other hand, each market might be served by several
firms, so that each firm would face competition at each store location. These two cases have
very different consumer welfare implications,38 clearly illustrating the importance of market
definition in any analysis of retail competition. This issue can only be resolved by narrowing our
analysis to small geographic submarkets and focusing on local competition. Schmalensee (1985)
provides an explicit statistical test for localization of competition in differentiated products
markets. However, because the differentiation considered here is simply spatial, I am able to rely
on simpler methodology. I present several conip!imentary pieces of evidence which demonstrate
that firms are unable to carve out local monopolies at almost any level of aggregation. The
fact that local monopoly is consistently so rare suggests that rivalry between firms is a central
feature of the mechanism underlying the competitive structure of the supermarket industry.
Extending the results presented above, I focus on competition in local markets between
supermarkets that are among the top 4 firms in an MSA. The top 4 concept is defined at the
MSA level: the top 4 firms are identified for each MSA and then the number of distinct top 4
firms operating in each zip code within that MSA is calculated. Table 6 presents the average
number of top 4 firms per zip code versus the average number of stores of any type per zip
code. The sample is restricted to only those zip codes which are served by at least one top 4
store (5995 of 8174 total zip codes). Since zip codes vary considerably by region, results are
broken down by region. For most regions, the average number of top 4 firms is well over 1,
suggesting that monopoly is relatively rare. However, conditioning on the presence of at least
one top 4 firm introduces selection that may confound this analysis. It also fails to control for
the size of the market, an omission which could bias these findings.
Table 7 addresses this concern by conditioning instead on the number of supermarket stores
of any type (including fringe stores). The number of stores is likely to provide an accurate
measure of the size of the market that fully reflects differences not captured by population
alone (e.g. the presence of shopping centers or other consumer attracting "poles"). Indeed,
the number of top 4 stores increases quite quickly with the total number of stores, indicating
38As noted earlier, once a local monopoly is established, the 3urviving monopolist may be able to charge the
monopoly price so long as re-entry is costly, even if his monopoly position resulted from vigorous competition to
become the low cost leader. Local monopoly can only serve to soften price competition and reduce the incentive
to invest in future quality enhancements or cost reducing investments.
that monopoly, when it does occur, is mostly confined to smaller markets. Table 8 extends this
analysis by identifying the frequency of monopoly outcomes. Here, I present the frequency of
one, two, three and four top 4 firm market configurations for two alternative market definitions.
Although almost half the zip code markets are served by only a single top 4 firm, this simply
reflects the small size of some zip codes: monopolies only account for a quarter of four digit
zip code markets. 39 Table 9 further illustrates this point by conditioning on the number of top
4 stores. For zip code markets which contain two or more top 4 stores (3355 of 5595 markets),
the frequencies of possible market configurations are presented. Multi-store monopoly is an
extremely rare occurrence. When zip codes can fit more than one top 4 store, most often there
is more than one top 4 firm.
In the appendix, I supplement this analysis by presenting maps of the actual locations of
all the supermarkets in four markets (MSAs): Tampa (FL), Sacramento (CA), Los Angeles
(CA), and Eugene (OR). Firm locations are matched to a zip code and plotted using symbols
that correspond to their overall share in the market (MSA). In each case, top 4 firms appear
to cluster in groups of 2 to 4. There is no evidence that, in equilibrium, firms serve distinct
regions of the market: in no case is there a distinct geographic region which is controlled by
a single top 4 firm, even though the share of the top firm approaches 30% in some markets.
This result is particularly striking in Tampa, where natural boundaries might facilitate market
power. Moreover, the interwoven structure of firm competition exists for both the smaller and
larger markets. This finding is difficult to reconcile with most models of product proliferation.
391t is important to keep in mind that a "monopoly" means only that the market is served by a single top 4
firm. Few of these markets are actually served by only one firm of any type.
Region
West
Northwest
Southwest
South
Ohio Valley
Great Lakes
Northeast
South Atlantic
Total Zip Codes
Top
Stores
3.6
2.4
2.9
3.0
3.3
3.0
2.4
3.3
Table 6
4 Firms Per Zip Code
Top 4 Firms Observations
1.9 1039
1.6 199
1.8 307
1.8 738
1.8 294
1.6 914
1.4 1333
1.9 1171
5995
Top 4 Firms in
Top 4 firms
Population
Observation
Total zip codes
1
.45
11122
2934
2
1.11
18711
1916
Table 7
Multi-Store Zip Codes
Number of Stores
3 4 5
1.69 2.04 2.28
25079 30957 54821
1278 853 546
8174
Market Type
Zip Code Markets
4 Digit Markets
Table 8
The Frequency of Monopoly Outcomes
Configuration
Monopoly Duopoly Triopoly Quadropoly
2943 1966 868 218
633 718 654 486
Total Markets
5595
2481
Population
30297
20296
23255
23046
22463
26628
21318
22632
6
2.58
38835
294
7+
2.83
48112
353
Table 9
Monopoly: Conditional on
the Number of Top 4 Stores
Number of Top 4 stores
Configuration 2 3 4 5+
Monopoly 265 29 8 1
Duopoly 1354 437 129 46
Triopoly - 428 276 164
Quadropoly - - 68 150
Total Markets 3355
The preceding exercises attempt to demonstrate that top firms do not serve geographically
distinct markets. Instead, firms compete directly with their rivals at every store location.
However, I was forced to argue this point using a variety of methods, none of which captured
the structure of competition in a single index. The final exercise of this empirical section
proposes a single index of concentration to characterize the industrial structure of the full set of
geographic markets. In particular, I construct an index of agglomeration which captures excess
concentration relative to that which would occur randomly with suitably weighted potential
locations (weighted, for example, by population). By comparing the calculated index for the
industry as a whole (all stores) to the index calculated for only the top firm in each market,
it is possible to test directly whether the lead firm chooses locations which are more localized
than the industry as a whole (i.e. locating within only a few distinct submarkets). Localization
is rejected if the index of concentration is the same or smaller for the top firm than for the
industry as a whole. Using this methodology, I am able to demonstrate that the top firm does
not select locations which are more clustered than the industry as a whole (or population),
thereby rejecting the hypothesis of localized competition.
3.5.5 A Single Index of Competition
The basic finding demonstrated here is that the top firm in a market chooses store locations in
manner which is no more geographically concentrated than the industry as a whole. To formalize
this logic, I employ the "dartboard" method developed by Glenn Ellison and Edward Glaeser
(1997). The authors propose a measure of spatial agglomeration that "'controls' for differences
in industry and data characteristics without knowing what combination of natural advantages
or spillovers is responsible for the agglomeration of each industry." In other words, their index
measures excess concentration, accounting for differences in the number of stores owned by a
firm and the size of the geographic region. The index was designed to capture the effect of
spillovers or advantages causing (manufacturing) firms to locate plants in the same geographic
regions. In practice, the index may be used to measure excess concentration among all plants
in an industry or among only those plants owned by a specific firm. "Excess concentration"
measures concentration beyond that which would be expected if firms chose plant locations
by throwing darts at a suitably weighted "board" of potential locations. In the context of
manufacturing, the weights are typically taken to be the share of overall manufacturing in
a local submarket. In the supermarket industry, a more appropriate measure is the overall
share of the consumer population residing in the local submarket. Using this index of excess
concentration, we can then test the hypothesis that the top firm in a market chooses locations
which are more agglomerated than the industry as a whole. This will not tell us whether
the lead firm can enter first and occupy the best locations. However, it will identify firms
that are attempting to serve distinct regions. Specifically, consider the following measure of
concentration:
Ei(si - xi)' - ZEi(1 -x2 " N
where si is the share of stores in submarket i, xi is the share of population in submarket i, and
N is the total number of stores in the overall market area (MSA). While the overall market
area for which each y is defined is taken to be an MSA, I will utilize several potential definitions
of the local submarket (e.g. zip code, 4 digit zip code, county). By evaluating this measure for
both the top firm and the industry as a whole, we are able to make a direct comparison of the
level of agglomeration among these two groups of firms. If firms succeed in dividing the market
into local monopolies, the top firm should be more clustered than the industry as a whole,
resulting in a larger value of y. Since it is not clear how large a local submarket a potential
monopolist might control, it is important to present a variety of local submarket definitions.
Table 10 presents parameter estimates of 7 calculated for each set of firms using two alter-
native submarket definitions: zip code and county. The sample of MSAs includes all markets
in the dataset where 7-y is defined; any market which contains only one submarket must be
dropped from the sample. Focusing first on 7 calculated for the industry as a whole (store -y),
I find that, for each market definition, 7-y is very close to zero. Since we expect retail firms to
locate close to their consumers, this is not surprising.40 For each definition of local market,
the estimate of 7y for the lead firm (top store 7) is smaller than -y for the industry as a whole
(store 7-y), indicating that, in equilibrium, the store locations chosen by the top firm are not
spatially clustered. However, because 7-y is a parameter estimate, the standard deviations of
7-y are much larger for the set of top firm stores, since fewer "darts" are being thrown. This
is clearly illustrated in Figures 3-8 and 3-9, which plot the distribution of 7 for the zip code
markets (county markets are presented in the appendix).41 Using this statistical evidence, the
hypothesis that -y is larger for the lead firm can be clearly rejected.
Table 10
Concentration in Local Markets - The Dartboard
All Markets
Zip Code County
Store -y -.013 -.004
(.035) (.021)
Top Store -y -.087 -.015
(.189) (.111)
Observations 311 102
The preceding evidence indicates that competition in the supermarket industry indeed takes
the form of natural oligopoly. This oligopolistic structure extends from the regional down
to the local level, where firms face competition from rival stores at each location. However,
whether the strategic interactions between oligarchs take the form of strategic complementarity
40 Ellison and Glaeser find that -y is closest to zero (no excess concentration) in markets where firms must locate
close to their end users.
4 1Restricting the sample by population to include only large markets improves the precision of the estimates
considerably. The hypothesis of greater agglomeration among the top firms is easily rejected.
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or substitution depends on whether quality enhancing investments increase the effective size of
the market, which we evaluate in the following section.
3.6 Quality Competition in the Supermarket Industry
The empirical results presented in the previous section demonstrate that many of the predictions
of the endogenous sunk cost VPD framework can by documented in the supermarket industry.
Moreover, several features of the industrial structure are difficult to reconcile with alternative
explanations where sunk costs are exogenously determined. The purpose of this second set of
results is not only to further distinguish exogenous from endogenous sunk cost models, but to
differentiate among the set of endogenous sunk cost models as well. Specifically, I demonstrate
that firms' quality choices are strategic complements. In addition to being inconsistent with
most models of exogenous sunk costs, this finding is also inconsistent with most models of
cost reducing exogenous or endogenous sunk investments. However, it is consistent with the
brandwidth model of quality enhancing sunk cost investment presented in chapter 4 and the
model analyzed in Ronnen (1991). I begin by demonstrating that a central prediction of the
VPD framework holds: that quality, market size and the number of entrants positively covary.
As a result, we cannot estimate a firm's reaction function by simply regressing the firm's choice
of quality on his opponents' choices. Therefore, I construct an instrument for the quality choices
of competing firms and perform the analysis using instrumental variables (IV) regressions.
Using this approach, I am able to demonstrate that quality choices by rival firms are strategic
complements. This finding, together with the findings on the structure of local competition
presented in the previous section, clearly demonstrates that the VPD framework provides a very
accurate picture of competition in the supermarket industry. While the alternative explanations
presented in section 3.3 may succeed in explaining one or even a few features of the industry,
the VPD framework reconstructs the unique combination of all of these features.
Our first set of empirical results addresses the relationship between store size (quality),
market size and the equilibrium number of entrants. According to the theory, larger markets
should have a greater number of entrants (up to the oligopoly limit) and a higher level of
quality. To document this covariation, I focus on the zip code as a local market, 42 and take
quality choice to be a dependent variable. Starting from the dataset of store level observations
for all 320 MSAs, I select out only those stores operated by firms which are in the top 4 at the
MSA level. 43 Fringe firms are assumed not to strategically interact with the top 4 firms. A
top 4 firm may then face between 0 and 3 other top 4 firms in a given zip code market. The
following reduced form regression is specified:
ln(sizeij) = al -Ilj +0C2 ' 2j + 33 13j + 0a4 - Marketj + 1:5 - MSA + ej
where sizeij is the size of store i in zip code j, Ilj, I2j, and 13j are dummy variables indicating
the presence of 1, 2 or 3 other top 4 firms in zip code j, and Marketj is a set of (logged) zip code
level demographic and market characteristic variables. MSA is a full set of MSA level fixed
effects and ej is an error term. Table 11 presents the regression results. The first two columns
present results for zip code level regressions while the final two columns utilize the larger, 4 digit
zip code market definition. Size is positively and significantly related to the presence of other
top 4 firms. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is monotonically increasing in the number
of competitors. This suggests that either the true size of the market is not fully captured by
our proxies or that some markets, for historical reasons, have fewer entrants and the lack of
rivalry reduces both competition and the equilibrium level of quality. Size is also positively
related to our measures of market size, population and income. In each case, the relationship
is concave, although it is only significant for the larger market definition (suggesting that these
measures are more accurate for the larger definition of a market). These results indicate that
equilibrium quality levels are determined by a mechanism consistent with the VPD framework,
where quality is an (endogenous) function of market size and the number of entrants. While
this finding further justifies focusing on the VPD framework, it does not directly rule out any
of the alternative mechanisms outlined in section 3.3. To do so, we must shift our focus to the
strategic interaction between firms.
In order to isolate the pure escalation effect (and assess its magnitude) and understand
421 will also present results for a larger local market definition (4 digit zip codes).
431I preserved the total number of stores of any type in each zip code to use as a regressor.
the strategic interaction between firms, I must estimate the structural model underlying the
competitive process. Specifically, I propose estimating the reaction functions of competing
firms. The following regression is specified:
ln(sizeij) = a,- ln(Avgsize\j) + a2 - ln(Avgsizei) + E 3 - Marketj + 1a4 - MSA + j
Here, sizeij is again the size of a store j in zip code k. Avgsize\i is the average size of
store i's competitors in zip code j. Avgsizei is the average size of the stores of the firm that
owns store i, outside of this MSA. Marketj is a set of 'p code level demographic variables,
MSA is a set of MSA fixed effects (included in select specifications) and ej is an error term.
As I documented above, firm size decisions are clearly endogenous. Unobserved factors such
as an advantageous location in a shopping district, a disproportionate share of commuters, or
idiosyncratic consumer preferences might cause some zip codes to have larger or smaller stores
on average. Not all of these effects will be captured by demographic variables. Furthermore, the
solution of the overall game implies a positive correlation between store size, market size and
the equilibrium number of entrants. We are interested not in the solution of the overall game,
but the strategic interaction among quality choices in the second stage of the game. Therefore,
an instrumental variables approach is warranted.
To perform this analysis, I propose instrumenting competitors store size using their average
store size outside of the MSA market.44 A similar approach is used to instrument for prices in
the context of new good valuation in Hausman (1994). Here, a firm's store size is assumed to
be correlated across markets for at least two reasons. First, there are clearly scale economies
inherent in providing a wide variety of products that go beyond the single MSA (see section
3.5.1 and chapter 2 of this thesis). Second, the benefits of maintaining a reputation for high
quality probably extend across markets, as do the returns from media advertising. However, the
tendency to provide larger stores is probably not related to the idiosyncratic forces driving store
size to be larger in any particular zip code market (such as elements of market size not fully
captured by population (e.g. the presence of shopping malls or a high percentage of "soccer"
44 This instrument may be constructed in several ways, using a firm's average outside this zip code but within
this MSA, across all stores outside this zip code (all MSAs) or across all stores outside this MSA. I explored each
alternative and concluded that the latter is the most appropriate instrument.
moms and stay at home parents)).
The first coluni of Table 12 can be viewed as the first stage of a two stage regression and
provides some justification for the choice of instrument. The remaining columns present several
specifications of the regression proposed above. The second column of Table 12 contains a base-
line specification involving only own size and competitor's size. The third and fourth columns
test the robustness of this specification by adding, MSA fixed effects and zip code demographics
respectively. The fifth column contains both sets of controls. The magnitudes of the competi-
tor's size coefficients are reduced but remain positive and significant for each specification. The
final column presents the specification of column 5, using the larger 4 digit zip code market
definition. The sizc effects are larger for the larger market size, which is not surprising. In every
specification, the complementarity result is positive and significant at the 1% level. Together,
these regression results provide strong evidence that the quality levels chosen by rival firms
are strategic complements. While this results is consistent with several models of VPD which
emphasize the demand expanding effect of quality enhancement, it casts a significant doubt on
a number of competing explanations of market structure, particularly models of cost reducing
investment. This evidence on the actual shape of firm's reaction functions, together with the
picture of the competitive structure of local markets presented earlier, suggests that the conm-
petitive, rivalrous emphasis of the VPD framework accords well with the observed structure of
the supermarket industry.
One Competitor
Two Competitors
Three Competitors
Population
(Population) 2
Income
(Income) 2
Market Level Controls
MSA Fixed Effect
R
2
Observations
Table 11
ýuality Regressions
Log Size
.086 .049 .162
(.010) (.011) (.017)
.147 .086 .192
(.011) (.014) (.017)
.175 .098 .220
(.015) (.020) (.017)
.090
(.079)
-.003
(.004)
.244
(.569)
-.014
(.027)
Included
Included
.15 .18 .15
12554
Standard errors in parentheses.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper attempts to explain how retail industries become dominated by a few large firms
in equilibrium. In particular, the high levels of concentration observed in the supermarket
industry are explained using an endogenous sunk cost model of vertical product differentiation.
In this framework, fierce competition leads to the emergence of a few dominant firms competing
in quality enhancing sunk outlays. The predictions of this model accord well with the features
of the supermarket industry documented here. Using a novel dataset of store level observations,
.117
(.019)
.135
(.020)
.160
(.023)
.360
(.074)
-.015
(.004)
1.69
(1.07)
-.084
(.050)
Included
.17
I demonstrate that the same number of high quality firms enter markets of varying sizes and
compete side by side for the same consumers. In addition to documenting a local structure
of competition consistent with the VPD framework, I demonstrate that the choice of quality
by rival firms behaves as a strategic complement. This key finding, which is consistent with
a VPD model of quality enhancing sunk outlays, eliminates several alternative explanations
concerning the nature of supermarket competition, including most standard models of cost-
reducing investment. As such, I conclude that the competitive mechanisms sustaining high
levels of concentration in the supermarket industry are inherently rivalrous and unlikely to lead
to the emergence of a single dominant firm.
These findings suggest several avenues of further research. First, the focus on providing
a wide array of products is not unique to the supermarket industry. Data from other con-
centrated retail industries such as consumer electronics, book stores and video rentals might
provide insight into whether similar forces are driving the emergence of dominant chains in
other markets. Second, the types of endogenous sunk costs most often analyzed, R&D and
advertising, have the property that firms can spend virtually infinite sums of money on them,
albeit with diminishing returns. R&D has never played a role in supermarket competition and
the importance of advertising appears to have decreased over time. Moreover, store size and
product selection, which seem to play a central role in supermarket competition, are naturally
bounded by physical constraints. Nevertheless, the high levels of concentration observed in the
supermarket industry have remained relatively stable for at least 25 years, despite substantial
changes in the identities of the dominant players. This suggests that competition may force
firms to find new ways to raise quality, perhaps shifting the focus of competition from adver-
tising to product selection. This can only be understood by building a truly dynamic model of
quality competition with continuous investment. Finally, little is understood about the welfare
implications of endogenous sunk cost investments. The equilibrium price charged by natural
oligopolists is strictly less than the monopoly price, but is well above marginal cost. Moreover,
natural oligopoly is consistent with high equilibrium profits. Do consumers benefit from the
relentless investment in quality driving competition in these models? Examining the welfare
properties of endogenous investment models is the subject of future research.
Table 12
IV Regressions
Log Size
Competitors' Size
Own Size .896
(.020)
.225
(.026)
.866
(.020)
.224
(.036)
.899
(.026)
Population
(Population)2
Income
(Income) 2
Constant .327
(.072)
Market Level Controls
MSA Fixed Effect
R2
Observations
-.372
(.107)
Included
.21 .23 .28
7867
Standard errors in parentheses.
.196
(.027)
.851
(.020)
-.076
(.098)
.004
(.005)
-.592
(.761)
.022
(.036)
4.74
(4.12)
Included
.23
.190
(.036)
.876
(.026)
-.104
(.101)
.005
(.005)
.172
(.819)
-.008
(.038)
Included
Included
.29
.240
(.054)
.899
(.029)
.292
(.111)
-.014
(.005)
1.24
(1.25)
-.061
(.059)
Included
Included
.28
8163
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Chapter 4
Modeling Competition in Retail
Industries: Cost Reduction and the
Role of Quality
4.1 Introduction
In several retail industries, vigorous price competition and strategic investment in sunk outlays
seems to lead to the emergence of a few dominant firms. The markets for books, video rentals,
auto supplies, and consumer electronics are all dominated by a few national chains (or, more
specifically, pairs of national chains) that invest heavily in advertising, information technology,
brandwidth and a variety of cost reducing innovations. Recent work in industrial organizations
argues that these concentrated equilibria follow from competition in cost-reducing investments
(Bagwell et al., 1997) that lead to the emergence of a single low-price, low-cost leader. Ad-
vertising may be used to achieve coordination with uniformed consumers, guiding them to the
eventual low-cost leader (Bagwell and Ramey, 1994). However, in both cases, competition
eventually yields a single low-cost leader who, if re-entry is costly, will be able to charge the
monopoly price. An alternative but related literature suggests that these investments may be
endogenous (Sutton, 1991), leading to the emergence of a few low-cost or high-quality firms,
but not monopoly. This prediction seems to accord well with evidence from several retail in-
dustries.' The goal of this paper is to formulate a model of retail competition with endogenous
sunk investments where a few low-cost or high-quality firms - but not one firm - emerge in equi-
librium. In addition, I will demonstrate that, when investments in quality increase consumers
willingness-to-pay, the strategic interaction between firms can distinguish oligopoly models from
mechanisms leading to a single dominant firm.
To understand this exercise more clearly, this paper first reviews the baseline endogenous
sunk cost vertical product differentiation (VPD) model developed in Sutton (1991). I demon-
strate that, in this model of quality differentiation, the level of quality chosen by rival firms
behaves as a strategic substitute. Next, applying the central insight of Spence (1975, 1976) -
that when services or quality are a perfect substitute for price reductions, so that consumers
care only about price per unit of quality (efficiency units), quality increases are the equiva-
lent of price reductions from the point of view of both buyer and seller - I demonstrate that
Sutton's quality differentiation model is equivalent to a model of cost reducing investment.
Reinterpreted as a model of cost reduction, Sutton's natural oligopoly result applies not only to
models of quality differentiation, but to any industrial application where "rivalry is both tough
and focused on fixed outlays, not on per-unit price-cost margins" (Schmalensee, 1992). This
finding suggests that the natural oligopoly structure and the endogenous sunk cost framework
extends beyond models of quality competition and VPD, having an impact on any industry
where costs are reduced through fixed and sunk investments.
That Sutton's baseline model can be reformulated as a model of cost reduction follows from
the fact that quality and price enter consumer's indirect utility functions as a ratio, so that
consumers care only about the unit cost of quality. The central theoretical contribution of
this paper is demonstrating that when the relationship between quality and price is non-linear
(so that quality and price are no longer forced to be proportional) the strategic interaction
between firms shifts from strategic substitutes to complements. This result follows from the
fact that, with this modification, increases in quality induce consumers to substitute out of an
outside good and devote a larger share of income to the quality good. 2 In effect, consumers are
'Several retail industries are dominated by pairs of firms that often locate very close to one another; examples
include Blockbuster and West Coast Video, Circuit City and Best Buy, Walmart and Kmart, and Staples and
Office Depot. Several of these industries support smaller chains as well (e.g. Office Max and The Good Guys).
Moreover, none of these industries appear to be converging to monopoly outcomes.
2In the baseline Sutton model, consumers allocate a constant share of their income to the quality good.
allowed to care about the overall level of quality, as well as quality per dollar. These results
are comparable to findings by Ronnen (1991) and Lehmann-Grube (1997) using an alternative
set-up based on Shaked and Sutton (1983).
These results on the strategic interaction between firms demonstrate that, by estimating
firm's reaction functions, it is possible to distinguish models where quality increases expand con-
sumer's willingness-to-pay from models of cost-reducing investment. This implication extends
well beyond the specific examples presented here. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) demonstrate that
investment into cost-reducing or quality enhancing R&D are strategic substitutes under fairly
general conditions. Athey and Schmutzler (1999) extend these results to include several addi-
tional classes of models, including Bertrand or Cournot competition with differentiated goods,
constant marginal costs and linear demand (e.g. Dixit, 1979), horizontal product differentia-
tion (HPD) on the line (d'Aspremont ct al., 1979) or the circle (Salop, 1979) with quadratic
transportation costs, and the VPD model of Shaked and Sutton (1983). As such, it is therefore
possible to predict whether certain retail markets will continue to be ruled by a few oligarchs
or will eventually be served by only a single firm by simply observing the strategic interaction
between firms. This exercise is applied to the supermarket industry in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the baseline model of Sutton (1991),
demonstrating how competitive investment in sunk outlays leads to a natural oligopoly of high
quality firms. This result is contrasted with an example where costs are exogenously determined
and the number of entrants increases proportionately with the size of the market. I demonstrate
that, in the endogenous sunk cost case, the reaction functions of rival firms are always local
strategic substitutes. In section 3, I demonstrate that the baseline Sutton model is equivalent
to a model of cost reducing investment, where quality does not enter the consumer's utility
function. Section 4 presents the brandwidth or demand expanding model of endogenous sunk
investment, demonstrating how the strategic interaction among rival firms shifts to strategic
complementarity. I conclude with a discussion of the results and topics for future research.
4.2 The Baseline Model
The goal of this first set of theoretical results is to provide an overview of the baseline model and
principal empirical implications of Sutton (1991). In particular, I will identify the conditions
that result in natural oligopoly and illustrate their implications for the equilibrium level of
quality, number of entrants, and the level of sunk investments. These results are compared to
the case where costs are exogenously determined, firms do not competitively invest in quality
enhancing sunk outlays, and the number of entrants is unbounded (as market size expands).
Finally, I demonstrate that, in the baseline endogenous sunk cost model, quality choices by
rival firms are always local strategic substitutes.
In the baseline model, firms are assumed to produce a single product. Across firms, products
may differ in an index of perceived quality z. Increasing in z raises the marginal utility of the
differentiated good. The perceived quality z may be interpreted as the (advertising based)
image of a product, a measure of a product's desirable physical characteristics, or any feature
of the product which raises consumers' willingness to pay. The key assumption is that increases
in perceived quality are achieved through investments which are both fixed and sunk, as they are
incurred in the preliminary stage of the game and are independent of the volume of production.
Typical examples include, but are not limited to, advertising and R&D. In the context of
supermarket competition, a natural candidate for perceived quality is the range of products
carried by a particular store. I will call this measure brandwidth. Brandwidth can affect
consumers' choices in at least two ways. First, consumers may in fact be willing to pay more
on average in a store that can fill all of their idiosyncratic needs. Second, faced with two stores
charging identical prices, it is reasonable to conclude that consumers may unambiguously prefer
the store with a greater variety. A store wishing to expand its brandwidth must construct a
larger store and, perhaps investing in more advanced information technologies and distribution
systems. In the current model, this enhancement of willingness to pay is captured through the
single index z.
On the demand side, M identical consumers are assumed to have utility
u(xl,x2, z) = (1 - a) ln(xi) + a ln(zx2) (4.1)
defined over two goods: a Hicksian composite commodity xi and the quality differentiated good
x2 which is the focus of our analysis. Increases in the perceived quality of x2 enter the utility
function multiplicatively. I assume each consumer is endowed with Y units of good 1. Take
the composite good to be the numeraire (p1 = 1) (so that, ignoring any distribution of profits,
each consumer has wealth Y) and let p(z) be the price of a differentiated good of quality z.
If a consumer chooses to consume a differentiated good of quality z, the quantities demanded
will be x, = (1 - a)Y and X2 = yielding indirect utility
V(p(z), Y, z) = (1 - a) in[(1 - a)Y] + a In (4.2)
Note that quality and price enter the indirect utility function as a ratio. Quality enhancements
increase consumers' indirect utility through an increase in "quality per dollar." I assume there
are N identical firms, where firm j uses input F(zj) + cqj of the composite good to produce
quantity qj of the differentiated good of quality zj. Competition is modeled as a three stage
game. In the first stage firms choose whether or not to enter and incur a fixed entry cost a.
In the second stage, firms choose a level of quality z, incurring the fixed cost F(z). In the
third and final stage, firms compete in the product market. Product market competition is
modeled as Cournot. Using this basic framework, I can now illustrate both the exogenous and
endogenous sunk cost subcases.
4.2.1 The Exogenous Sunk Cost Case
In the exogenous sunk cost case, quality is fixed and no longer a decision variable for the firm.
Firms still must pay a fixed cost of entry, which can be thought of as the minimum efficient
scale of a plant (or in the context of supermarket firms, a store), the level of which is determined
exogenously by the industry's underlying technology. Without loss of generality, I assume all
firms produce output of the quality zj = 1 and let p(z) = p. Market demand and supply are
therefore and _,Y=1 qj = Q, respectively. Since quality is fixed in this case, fixed costs
are not a function of z. Fixed cost are given by F(1) = o, the (exogenous) fixed cost of entry.
aYM
Consequently, firm j maximizes profit 7rj = Q--qj - cqj - o yielding the first order condition
aYM(Q - qj) = cQ2
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Figure 4-1: Concentration ) versus market size: fragmentation
for all j. I conclude by symmetry that qj = q for all j and hence Q = qN. The resulting
equilibrium quantities and price are
(N- 1) aYM
= N 2  C
and
p= N- c)
Each firm j earns equilibrium profit 7rj = --. Assuming there will be entry as
long as 7r j > 0 and ignoring the constraint that N be an integer, the equilibrium number of
entrants is N = . Figure 4-1 shows the relationship between concentration (measured
by 1) and market size (measured by YM) for the case with a = ½ and o = 50. The
figure illustrates the limit theorem that obtains in the exogenous sunk cost case, "where scale
economies become unimportant as a constraint on equilibrium structure in large economies"
(Sutton, 1991). Alternatively, for market size aYM greater than &, there are at least four
firms in equilibrium. The four firm concentration ratio is then given by C4 = 4 a• which
declines monotonically to zero as the ratio of market size to set up costs increases.
I
I
4.2.2 The Endogenous Sunk Cost Case
I now allow firm j to vary its quality zj, making the level of perceived quality an endogenous
choice variable of the firm. I continue to assume Cournot competition in the third (product
market competition) stage. As before, I proceed via backwards induction, analyzing the final
product market competition stage first. It follows from the indirect utility function (4.2) that
consumers will choose a product that maximizes that quality-price ratio . Because theZi
qualities zj are treated as fixed in the final stage, Cournot competition forces the equilibrium
prices of all goods with positive market share to be proportionate to their perceived qualities
such that P(z-) = k for all j. Using this relationship between price and quality, I can now solveZ3
for the market clearing price.
Let the number of consumers purchasing from firm j be mj. Then, using the demand
functions derived earlier and substituting in for price, I conclude that
mjyY =mijaY
= p(zj) kzj
Since M = E ,y = 4k Z1 zjqj I can solve for k = •=• and substitute this back intoJ- aY = Nzjqj
the price relationship, yielding p(z) = aYMzE 1 z. q.
I am now in a position to solve for the equilibrium quantities selected in the final stage.
Differentiating the profit function with respect to qi yields the first order condition
/N /N 2
zj (fzjqj, = YM ( zj)qj (4.3)
jl:Aj a=1
Following Sutton (1991) I focus on identifying a symmetric equilibrium in both quantity
and quality. For the two firm case, it is the unique equilibrium. Alternative models emphasize
asymmetric equilibria (in quality) along with several modifications to the structure of the game.
In both Shaked and Sutton (1983) and Ronnen (1991), income is heterogeneous, competition
is Bertrand, and consumption is restricted to unit demand. 3 In equilibrium, a finite number
of firms enter, each offering a unique quality and price combination and targeting a distinct
"income band" of consumers. Lehman-Grube (1997) establishes a similar asymmetric natural
3This restriction is particularly troubling in the context of supermarket competition.
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oligopoly result when entry is sequential rather than simultaneous. 4 However, in the context
of retail competition, asymmetric equilibria in quality do not seem to reflect observed firm
behavior. In several retail industries, symmetric strategies are common. For example, the stores
operated by Circuit City and Best Buy, Walmart and Kmart, Office Depot and Staples, and the
dominant supermarket chains are often difficult to distinguish and are frequently located close
to their competitors' stores, suggesting that these firms are not targeting distinct consumer
segments, as the asymmetric models imply, but competing instead for the same customers.
Since the focus here is on explaining firm behavior in these industries, I follow Sutton (1991)
in characterizing symmetric equilibria in quality.
Assuming qj = q and zj = z for all j, equation (4.3) reduces to z(N - 1)zq = N-N2Z 2q2.
Consequently,
q N -- 1) aYM9 N2 C
and
(NP= N-1 c
which are the same results obtained for the exogenous sunk cost case, but here they hold
irrespective of the level of z. Identifying the symmetric equilibrium level of quality requires
solving for each firm's best response function. I proceed by assuming that a single firm deviates
from this symmetric equilibrium to offer quality zi while the remaining N - 1 firms offer quality
z. The first order conditions (4.3) reduce to
zi(N - 1)zq = c (zlqi + (N - 1)zq) 2  (4.4)
aYM
and
z(zl q 1 + (N - 2)zq) = c(zlql + (N - 1)zq) 2  (4.5)Y M
yielding equilibrium quantities
aYM [(N- 1I)zz1- (N- 2)z(N-- 1)z
c4The first entrant chooses the highest level of quality and earns the largest profit in equilibrium.]2
4The first entrant chooses the highest level of quality and earns the largest profit in equilibrium.
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q aYM (N - 1)zlz
c [(N[--1)zi+z]2
and price p(zl) = (N-1)jz]c Therefore, the profit function of the deviant firm is
(z[(N-1)z - (N- 2)z
r(zl) = aYM -(N z-N- 2)z 2  F(zi) (4.6)(N - 1)zl + z
Using this expression for profits, I can now solve the game as a whole and identify the symmetric
equilibrium level of quality z. Differentiating the profit function (4.6) yields the first order
condition
0rw(zl) - 2aYM(N- 1)2[(N - 1)zl - (N - 2)z]z _ F' = 0 (4.7)
1z9 [(N - 1)zt + z]3
To proceed it is necessary to select a functional form for the fixed cost function. I follow
Sutton (1991) in specifying the function F(z) = a+ (z7-1), which includes both the exogenous
fixed entry cost a and a second term that depends on the level of quality chosen. To solve for
the symmetric equilibrium5 in quality, I let zj = z and solve (4.7) for z yielding
Z 2aYM(N - 1)2(.
z = Ns )(4.8)N3s
Figure 4-2 shows z and F(z) as a function of market size for the case where a = ½, = 2,
s = 1, N = 2, and a = 10. While varying each of the parameters has an effect on both z and
F(z), the natural oligopoly result turns most directly on the value of -Y. Figure 4-3 presents
a graph of F(z) for -y equal to 2 (f(YM))and 7 (f2(YM)) respectively (the other parameters
are the same as Figure 4-2). Since fixed costs grow proportionately with market size (they
were constant in the exogenous case), it should not be surprising to find an equilibrium where
the number of firms does not expand with the size of the market. Furthermore, since fixed
costs grow more slowly for larger values of 7y, we might also expect a larger number of entrants
when -y is larger. To make this intuition precise requires solving for the equilibrium number of
entrants.
"Again, the symmetric equilibrium seems to accord well with the strategies of dominant firms observed in
several retail industries.
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The equilibrium profit with N firms is
aYM
7 = N2 - F(z)
Assuming that firms will enter as long as w7ri 0, the non-negative profit condition is
N - f (N) - 0'- > 0 (4.9)
where f(N) = (4 + y)N - 2(N 2 + 1). Dividing through by aYM yields
f(N) -O-N) y> 0 (4.10)
N3 aY M -
which provides a clear illustration of the mechanism determining the equilibrium number of
firms: the largest N such that the first term is greater than or equal to the second. Figure 4-4
plots each component of equation 4.10 as a function of N for the example where y = 2, a = ,
s = 4, a = 1, and YM = 10. The effect of each parameter is easy to identify. Whether the
second term YM , which does not depend on N, lies above or below zero depends on the
sign of (a - ). For (a - > 0, as in Figure 4-4, the second term is positive. Therefore,
increases in market size (measured by aYM or YM) shift this horizontal line down, increasing
the level of N at which the functions intersect. That the asymptotic number of firms is finite
is clear from the fact that the first term asymptotes (as n -+ c ) to a level below zero, while
the second term converges to zero (as aYM - co). For (a- 1)<0 the behavior is more
complicated since the second term is now negative. In this case, increasing market size actually
shift the second term up (toward 0), so that the equilibrium number of entrants may actually
increase and then decrease as market size expands.
To illustrate the behavior of the equilibrium number of entrants more clearly, consider
the following exercise that treats the number of firms as a continuous variable. Under this
assumption, I can rewrite the zero-profit condition (4.9) as
(s--Y) N3
-
2N2+(4+ )N-2=0 (4.11)
aYThe fact tha  the number of firms will not increase indefinitely with the size of the marketThe fact that the number of firms will not increase indefinitely with the size of the market
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Figure 4-4: Determining the equilibrium number of entrants
is immediately obvious from equation (4.11). As market size (measured by YM) increases to
infinity, the lead term drops out, leaving a quadratic polynomial with root 6
N=l+-Y+- y+ 2  (4.12)4 4
which depends only on 7 and is finite for all finite y. This result follows from the fact that z,
and therefore F(z), grows more slowly with larger values of Y. This allows more firms to "fit"
into the market, reflecting the lower level of fixed costs that must be recovered in equilibrium.
For finite values of YM, the solution of (4.11) depends on the sign of the lead term. In
particular, whether the equilibrium number of entrants approaches the limit (4.12) from above
or below depends on whether s - -yo is positive or negative. Figure 4-5 shows a graph of (4.11)
using parameters for which s - -y is negative (Nn(n)), zero(No(n)), and positive (Np(n)),
illustrating how the shape of the polynomial depends on the sign of the lead term. The root
determining the equilibrium number of firms corresponds closely to the root of the quadratic
(4.12). Figure 4-6 shows profit as a function of N for the case where the lead term s - yu is
negative. Since profit approaches the negative limit -u + . from below, it is clear that theysecond root is not viable.
second root is not viable.
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6The second root is always less than 1.
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Figure 4-6: Profit in equilibrium
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Figure 4-7: Concentration as a function of market size
Finally, using analytical solutions of equation (4.12), I can illustrate the non-fragmentation
result. Figure 4-7 shows the relationship between concentration (measured by I) for the cases
where the lead term is negative (concl), zero (conc), and positive (conc2). The fact that the
relationship between market size and concentration is non-monotonic when the lead term is
positive is a sharp departure from static formulations of scale economies, where concentration
falls monotonically as market size expands. Empirical studies of endogenous sunk cost industries
have uncovered two types of behavior. The studies of Sutton (1991) and Robinson and Chiang
(1996) find behavior consistent with a negative lead term, where concentration monotonically
declines to the asymptotic lower bound. In chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, I present data on
firm concentration in the supermarket industry that seems to fit the non-monotonic case where
concentration first falls and then increases.
The purpose of this first set of theoretical results is to illustrate Sutton's (1991) model
of quality competition and highlight the forces that drive the non-fragmentation and natural
oligopoly results. The comparative statics presented here can be tested using data from a variety
of industries. The focus on symmetric equilibria in quality make retail industries a particularly
attractive candidate. In the following subsection, I examine the strategic interaction between
firms and demonstrate that quality choices by rival firms are always strategic substitutes near
the equilibrium. This result distinguishes Sutton's (1991) model of quality competition from
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alternative formulations where quality enhancements increase consumers' willingness to pay.
4.2.3 The Behavior of Best Response Functions
Sutton (1991) argues that industries in which firms competitively invest in endogenous sunk
investments will converge to concentrated equilibria by way of a quality escalation mechanism.
In this process, outcomes which are "too fragmented" will be broken as markets tend toward
equilibrium. In particular, "as market size increases, the incentives to escalate spending on
fixed outlays rises. Increases in market size will be associated with a rise in fixed outlays by at
least some firms and this effect will be sufficiently strong to exclude an indefinite decline in the
level of concentration" (Sutton, 1997). This follows from the fact that the relative increase that
a firm can achieve through an increase in fixed outlays is correspondingly greater as each firm's
market share is relatively smaller. However, the quality escalation mechanism cannot refer to
the strategic interaction between firms in equilibrium and attempts to interpret it in this way
are misleading.
In fact, the strategic interaction between firms in the baseline Sutton model has not been
discusses explicitly in prior work,7 despite the fact that it is both theoretically interesting and
empirically informative to understand how quality choices interact within equilibrium. The
following proposition demonstrates that quality choices between rival firms are always strategic
substitutes in the baseline model.
Proposition 2 In the baseline model of Sutton (1991), quality choices by rival firms are always
strategic substitutes near the equilibrium.
Proof. While the baseline model does not afford an analytical solution for a firm's best
response function, it is possible to calculate its slope by evaluating the cross partial derivative
of the profit function (4.6):
a27r(zi) = 2aYM(N- 1)2 [(N - 1) 2 z2 - 2(N - 1) 2 zlZ + (N - 2)z 2] (4.13)
&zZOz [(N- 1)zl + z]4
7Ronnen (1991) evaluates the strategic interaction between firms in the Shaked and Sutton (1983) set-up.
However, competition in that model is Bertrand, equilibria are asymmetric, and there is no notion of market
size.
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Evaluated at zl = z, equation (4.13) reduces to
2oaYM(N - 1)2 (-N 2  3N -3)!•/4Z2  (- 2 +  3)
,1V4 2Z
which is strictly negative. Therefore, locally (around the equilibrium), quality choices are always
strategic substitutes. 0
Away from equilibrium, quality choices may be either substitutes or complements, as the
following example illustrates. Choosing parameters a = 1, s = 1, a = 1, YM = 512 and
-y = 2, equation (4.8) yields equilibrium z = 8 and equation (4.9) yields 2 equilibrium entrants.
Solving for firm l's best response as a function of firm 2's quality yields
br(z2) = 8 /-z 2
Figure 4-8 shows the best response functions of each firm. They are clearly negatively sloped
at the equilibrium and the portions over which they are positively sloped occur quite far from
the equilibrium. Nonetheless, if the fixed cost functions for rival firms are sufficiently different,
it is possible for the reaction functions to cross at a point where quality is a complement for
the low cost firm and a substitute for the high cost firm (imagine shifting the dotted curve in
figure 4-8 far to the left). This outcome recalls the Bulow et al. (1985a) model of capacity
competition with extremely convex demand functions, where the strategic interactions are also
asymmetric and the reaction functions are nearly identical to those presented here.
Substitutability at the equilibrium can be further illustrated by analyzing the first order
conditions for the equilibrium level of quality (equation (4.7)) and signing the slope of the
firms reaction functions indirectly (this is the method I will use in section 4, where closed form
solutions are not feasible). Figure 4-9 plots the right hand side (RHS) and left hand side
(LHS) of equation (4.7) as a function of zi. LHS(zl) uses the equilibrium level of z, while
LHS2(zi) uses z + 1. The effect of an increase in z is to shift LHS(zi) down, decreasing the
point of intersection and the equilibrium level of zj, illustrating how a firm's optimal choice of
quality falls when a rival chooses a higher level of quality.
The goal of this first theoretical section is to present the Sutton (1991) model of quality
competition and to demonstrate that, in this model, quality choices by rival firms behave as
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strategic substitutes. In the following section, I demonstrate that this model of quality com-
petition is equivalent to a model of cost-reducing investment, where quality never enters a
consumer's indirect utility function. The strategic substitute result (Proposition 2) continues
to hold. This finding is significant for two reasons. First, the fact that Sutton's model of
quality competition can be reformulated as a model of cost-reduction suggests that his non-
fragmentation and natural oligopoly results are applicable to a much broader class of industries
than the advertising and R&D intensive industries emphasized in Sutton (1991). This result
implies that, for markets to exhibit endogenous sunk cost behavior, "what does seem to be nec-
essary is that market share be sufficiently sensitive to variations in fixed costs, so that rivalry
is both tough and focused on fixed outlays, not on per-unit price-cost margins" (Schmalensee,
1992). This condition is likely to hold in several retail industries, where firms invest extensively
in both information technology and firm specific distribution systems (e.g. Walmart). Second,
recasting quality competition as cost-reduction connects this endogenous sunk cost framework
up to the 17roader class of cost-reduction models, where strategic substitution in investment is
the norm in most standard models (Bagwell and Staiger, 1994; Athey and Schmutzler, 1999).
In the final theoretical section of this paper, I present a model of quality competition where
investments are strategic complements, illustrating how estimating reaction functions can pro-
vide a useful way of distinguishing between alternative models of competition. This exercise is
applied to the supermarket industry in chapter 3 of this thesis.
4.3 Natural Oligopoly and Cost Reduction
In this section, I demonstrate that the baseline model can be reformulated as a model of
cost-reducing investment, where quality does not enter consumers' utility functions at all. Nev-
ertheless, all of the equilibrium properties presented in section 4.2 are preserved. In the baseline
model, quality and price enter the indirect utility function (4.2) as a ratio. As a result, con-
sumers care about quality enhancements only in as much as they increase "quality per dollar."
Since consumers cannot distinguish between an increase in the quality-price ratio stemming
from an increase in the perceived level of quality and an increase in the ratio due to a fall
of the "price of quality," the central insight of Spence (1975, 1976) applies directly to this
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model. Specifically, quality increases are equivalent to price reductions from the viewpoint of
both buyer and seller. Consequently, the baseline model is equivalent to a model of cost reduc-
tion. This following proposition establishes that all of the equilibrium properties of the baseline
model continue to hold in this case.
Proposition 3 The baseline endogenous sunk cost model of Sutton (1991) is equivalent to a
model of cost reducing investment.
Proof. Assume again that firms produce and single good but the M identical consumers
each have utility
u(x1,x 2) = (1 - a)ln(x1 ) + aln(x2) (4.14)
where x1 is the quantity consumed of the composite good and x2 the quantity of the
differentiated good under analysis. There are N identical firms, where firm j uses input
F(zj) = oa + 'qj of the composite good to produce quantity qj of x2. In particular, the firm
may invest in fixed costs in order to reduce marginal costs by a fraction --. For example, a su-Zi
permarket building larger stores faces lower inventory costs per item and a microchip producer
building a larger fabrication plant produces chips with a lower cost per bit. Although x2 does
not appear to be a differentiated good to consumers, it is clearly differentiated on the input side.
Let p(z) be the price of the differentiated good with cost reducing parameter z. If a consumer
chooses to consume the differentiated good with parameter z, the quantities demanded will be
aYX= (1 - a)Y and x2 = p(z)
yielding indirect utility
V(p(z), Y, z) = (1- -) ln[(1- a-)Y] + aK Inp (4.15)
Market demand and supply are QMand Eý= qj. Firm j maximizes profit
aYM c
7 j - q= -- ~• q -i - F
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yielding first order condition
N C (N \2
zj(( qj) - qj) -= M qj (4.16)
j=1j=1
for all j. Therefore, if qj = q and zj = z for all j, we have z(Nq - q) = c(Nq)2 yielding
q -c
q=(N21) )aYMz9 N2 C
and equilibrium price
N-1P N c
I now allow firm j to vary its cost reducing parameter zj. I continue to assume Cournot
competition. Suppose a single firm deviates from this symmetric equilibrium to choose param-
eter zl while the remaining N - 1 firms choose the parameter z. The first order conditions
(4.12) reduce to
C
zi(N- 1)q = cy (qi + (N- 1)q) 2  (4.17)
aYM
z(qi + (N - 2)q) = cy (qi + (N - 1)q)2  (4.18)
aYM
with solutions
aYM (N - 1)zl- (N - 2)z
q - C =[N-1)z + Z]2  (N - 1)ziz (4.19)ql - c [(N - 1)zz + z]2
q = aYM (N - 1)ziz2  (4.20)
c [(N- 1)zl + z]2
Using p(zl) = oYM I conclude that
z) = [(N- 1)zl + z]c
(N - 1)zlz
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yielding profit
7r(z1) = aeYM[(N -1)zl-(N-2)z1 2  F(zi) (4.21)Trz)= YM- F(zz) (4.21)
(N- 1)zl + z
which is identical to model l (equation (4.6)). The remaining calculations, including both
the non-fragmentation and strategic substitutability results are unchanged from section 4.2. m
This proposition demonstrates that the emphasis on product quality in Sutton (1991) is
not a requirement for non-fragmentation or natural oligopoly. In particular, it is possible for
competition to be focused on endogenously determined sunk outlays and for the number of
equilibrium entrants to be bounded when the product of the sunk outlays is simply a reduction
in marginal costs. Therefore, it is not the case that, for the number of entrants to be bounded,
sunk outlays must increase consumers willingness to pay, as argued in Sutton (1991). It is
simply the case that competition be focused on sunk outlays, not price cost margins, as argued
in Schmalensee (1992). This finding suggests that the endogenous sunk cost framework may
be applied to any industry where sunk investments are the focus of competition. For exam-
ple, in several retail industries, the rise of dominant chains that invest heavily in advertising,
information technology and advanced distribution systems (Bagwell et al., 1997) may reflect
the endogenous nature of the sunk, cost-reducing investments necessary to compete in those
industries. Consequently, the long run equilibrium structure of those industries may be natural
oligopoly, not the monopoly outcomes suggested by Bagwell et al. (1997). In the following
section, I demonstrate that quality competition can be distinguished from cost-reduction by fo-
cusing on the strategic interaction between firms, and in so doing, identify the role of increasing
consumers' willingness to pay in the endogenous sunk cost framework.
4.4 A Model of Demand Enhancing Brandwidth
In this final theoretical section, I present the principal theoretical contribution of this paper:
a formal model of retail competition where quality choices by rival firms behave as strategic
complements. This result follows from the fact that, when quality and price enter the indirect
utility function non-linearly, quality increases induce consumers to devote a larger fraction of
their income to the quality good (in the baseline model this share of income is constant). This
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expansion of the market for the quality good causes the strategic interaction between rival firms
to shift from substitution to complementarity.
In the baseline model, quality enters the indirect utility function as the ratio of quality to
price such that consumers care only about the per unit cost of quality or "efficiency units."
Since consumers cannot distinguish an increase in the quality-price ratio stemming from an
increase in the perceived level of quality from an increase in the ratio due to a fall in the "price
of quality," the baseline model is really a disguised form of cost reduction, as demonstrated
in Section 4.2. Furthermore, in both specifications, the quantity consumed and the fraction of
income spent on the differentiated good are independent of the level of quality (cost reducing
parameter), leading to the strategic substitute property demonstrated in Section 4.2.3. I now
modify the utility function of the baseline model so that quality and price no longer enter as
a ratio and, as quality increases (with price held fixed), consumers spend a higher fraction of
their income on the differentiated good. As a result, I identify regions of the parameter space
for which quality is a strategic complement. Unfortunately, the derivation no longer permits a
closed form solution. As a result, this example relies on a graphical presentation.
Starting with the direct utility function
u(x,z) = (1 - a)lnxl  + azlnz 2  (4.22)
I let pl = 1 and p2(z) = p(z), yielding demand functions
X1 = Y
and
X2= 1-a•+zaz p(z)
Defining the function
oaz
a(z) = Z1-a+az
such that the demand functions can be written
a(z)Yxi = (1 - a(z))Y X2 p(z)p(z)
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it is clear that, for a fixed price, the effect of an increase in quality is an expansion of the
fraction of income spent on the quality good. Since indirect utility is given by
V(p(z), z, Y) = (1- a)In ( 1 (- Y)+ aln az ) ) (4.23)1 zaz 1-a+az pz)
I can show that
kz
p(z) = ______(1 - a + az)l/ck
where k is a constant which depends only on a and Y. Defining
z(z) =z (1 - a + az)1/'
I conclude that
p(z) = ko(z)
Following along the steps of the derivation of the baseline model, I calculate the first order
conditions for the equilibrium quantity selected in the final stage
/N 2
q(zj) EO(z,)qj,(= -M 0(zj)qj (4.24)
where O(z) = (  Consider again a symmetric equilibrium in which qj = q and zj = z.a(z)"
Equation (4.25) reduces to
O(z)(N - 1)O(z)q = YcN2((z)q) 2YM
Consequently,
( N21) a(z)YM (4.25)
and
p(z) W= c (4.26)
which are identical to the baseline model with a(z) replacing a. Supposing a single firm deviates,
the first order conditions (4.25) reduce to
c- 1)(z)q = [(z)q + (N - 1)(z)q] (4.27)
¢(zz)(Ng- 1) (z)q- YM [#(zi)qi + (N - 1)#(z)q] (4.27)
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and
c
O(z) [V(zl)qi + (N - 2)b(z)q] YM [b(zl)ql + (N - 1)b(z)q] (4.28)
yielding equilibrium quantities
=a(zi)YM [(N - 1)0(zi) - (N - 2)0(z)1 (c [(N - 1)O(zl) + O(z)]2 -)(z)
and
a(z)YM (N - 1)0(zj)O(z)](4.30\q= c [( )(Zl)+ ((4. ))]2
and price
p(Zl) = [(N - 1)_(zi)_+ O(z)c (4.31)p(zl) = Ic(N(4031)(N 
- 1)¢( z) c
Consequently, the profit function of the deviant firm is given by
[(Ng- 1)¢(zl) -(NY- 2)¢(z)2
= C(zl)YM (N - 1) (z) (z) - F(zi) (4.32)1 (N - 1)0(zi) + O(z)
which is simply the baseline model profit equation (4.6) with a(z) replacing a and O(z) replacing
z. Solving the game as a whole, I differentiate the profit function (4.33) to find the first order
condition determining the equilibrium level of quality
a'(zl)YM (N-1)i(zi)-(N-2)¢(z) 2
1 (N-1)0(zl)+O(z)
+2a(zI)YM(N - 1)2 '(zl) [(N-1)0(zi)-(N-2)0(z)]¢(z)[(N-1)0(zl)+O(z)]'
-F'(zi) = 0
Choosing the functional form of F(z) used in the baseline model and setting zi = z yields
azYM[N(1 - az) + 2(N - 1)2(1 - a)(1 - z)](4.33)
= .sz (4.33)(1 - a + az)2N 3
as the fundamental equation which determines equilibrium brandwidth z given the number of
entrants N.
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4.4.1 The Behavior of Best Response Functions
In section 4.2, I was able to show that, in the baseline model, a firm's choice of quality behaves
as a strategic substitute near the equilibrium. While an analytic solution for each firm's best
response function is still unavailable, it is possible to calculate its slope by evaluating the cross
partial derivative of the profit function (4.33):
az7rz
azlOz
-2a'(zi)YM[(N - 1)¢(zi) - (N - 2)0(z)] [ (N-)2(z)(z)]1[(g-1)¢Czj)+O(z)]3 1
+2a(z)YM(N - 1)2 '(z) [(N-1)2[1(z1)] 2-2(N-1) 2 1(z)¢(zi)+(N-2)[O(z)]2]
+2a(z)YM(N - )21) ) [(N-1)0(z )+O(z)]4
Evaluated at z, = z, equation this reduces to
2a'(z)YM(N - 1)2 0'(z) 2a(z)YM(N - 1)2(-N 2 + 3N- 3) 2'(z)
N3  (z) + N 4  [O(Z)
which can be rewritten as
2caYM(N - 1)2 q'(z) F2N -3]2aYM(N -1) (z)[-(1 - z)+ 2N-3 (1 - a)(1 - z) (4.34)
(1 - a + az)2g 3 O(Z) Y
The term outside the brackets is strictly positive. Inside the brackets, the second term is
negative for all N > 1 and z > 1, while the first term depends on the level of z, yielding an
analog of the income and substitution effect. The following example demonstrates a case in
which the effect of the first term outweighs the second. Choosing parameters a = ½, s = 1,
a = L, YM = 75 and 7 = 2, yields 2 equilibrium entrants (N = 2) and equilibrium z = 1.5.
Figure 4-10 plots the right hand side (rhs) and left hand side (lhs) of the first derivative of
profit as a function of zl. lhs(zi, 1.5) uses the equilibrium level of z, while lhs(zl, 2) uses z = 2.
The effect of an increase in z is to shift lhs(zi, z) up, increasing the point of intersection and the
equilibrium level of zl. Therefore, at least locally, the slope of the reaction function is positive.
As such, the optimal response to a rival's quality increase is to increase own quality. Unlike the
model of cost-reducing investment presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3, investment by rival firms
actually increases the return to own investment, resulting in strategic complementarity.
Moreover, the complementarity result is not limited to this particular example. Analogous
findings are presented in Ronnen (1991) and Lehmann-Grube (1997). In Ronnen's example,
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consumers' incomes are allowed to vary and competition is Bertrand. In the resulting equi-
librium, firms offer a staggered set of qualities. In the two firm case, when the high quality
firm raises its quality, the low quality firm follows suit and vice versa. The result follows from
the fact that the market is not fully covered in equilibrium so that changes in quality induce
consumers who previously consumed the outside good to join the market. Again, quality en-
hancements effectively increase the available "pie". Lehmann-Grube presents similar results to
Ronnen in a model with sequential entry. However, neither of these models contain a notion of
market size and consumers are restricted to consuming only a single unit of the quality good.
The resulting equilibria are also asymmetric.
The theoretical results presented in this section illustrate that models of quality competition
where quality enhancements increase consumers' willingness to pay involve different strategic
interactions among firms than models where these enhancements simply reduce the perceived
cost of quality. However, as the models in sections 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate, increasing willingness
to pay is not a requirement for non-fragmentation. Nonetheless, the finding of complemen-
tarity provides a method of distinguishing between models of endogenous sunk investment by
estimating reaction functions. Moreover, because strategic complementarity in investment is
relatively rare among standard investment models (Athey and Schmutzler, 1999), a finding of
complementarity eliminates several alternative models of competition, including most standard
models of capacity competition, horizontal product differentiation, cost-reducing investment
and product proliferation. This exercise is applied to the supermarket industry in chapter 3 of
this thesis.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that the manner in which quality enters the indirect utility function
plays a key role in determining how firms strategically interact. Using Sutton's (1991) model
of quality differentiation, I demonstrate that quality choices are always strategic substitutes
near the equilibrium. Furthermore, I demonstrate that this model is equivalent to a form of
cost reducing investment. Then, by modifying the utility function, I identify parameters for
which quality choices are strategic complements. The result follows from the fact that quality
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Figure 4-10: An example of strategic complementarity
enhancements induce consumers to spend a higher fraction of their income on the quality good.
I call this demand enhancing property the brandwidth effect. These results suggest that when
quality is brandwidth, VPD models can be distinguished by estimating firm reaction functions.
Since most standard models of cost reduction imply strategic substitution in investment (Bag-
well and Staiger, 1994; Athey and Schmutzler, 1999), a finding of complementarity can rule
out broad classes of competing models of industrial structure. This exercise is applied to the
supermarket industry in chapter 3 of this thesis.
This framework invites several extensions. First, I would like to identify general conditions
under which cost reducing investment results in a natural oligopoly of firms. In particular, it
should be possible to identify the modifications necessary for the model of Bagwell et al. (1997)
to yield natural oligopoly, instead of a single dominant firm. Second, by allowing consumers to
vary in income, it should be possible to derive a complementarity result analogous to Ronnen
(1991), where a finite number of firms produce a staggered set of qualities. However, using
the current approach I can relax the assumption that consumers only demand a single unit
and directly incorporate a measure of market size. Third, by allowing firms to enhance quality
through distinct investments at both the store and firm level, it should be possible to derive
comparative static results concerning the optimal size of a chain of stores and, therefore, esti-
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mate the size distribution of retail chains. These predictions could then be tested using location
and ownership data from a variety of retail industries.
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Figure 5-3: Lorenz Curves - Southwestern Markets (MSAs)
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Figure 5-6: Lorenz Curves - Great Lakes Markets (MSAs)
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Figure 5-8: Lorenz Curves - South Atlantic Markets (MSAs)
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